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THE COMPROMISED CARGO CONTAINER: TERROR IN A Box

Taylor Simpson- Wood*
While we cannot expect to screen every maritime
container entering the United States, we need to provide
some expectation of inspection, or create some level of
deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the
intermodal system to smuggle cargo. We are so busy
investigating in a[n] anti-ballistic missile defense
system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater threat: a
cargo container equipped with a digital global
positioning system can be delivered anywhere in the
United States for less than $5,000. Why would the
enemies of America spend millions on a rocket launcher
and go up against the US. Air Force and U.S. Navy
when they could spend $5,000 to ship a containerfull of
explosives or other dangerous materials that has only a
two percent chance of being inspected?
I.

Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings'

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the focus of
the U.S. government, in terms of homeland security was on national
missile defense 2 or international aviation, 3 not on the vulnerability of its
* Taylor Simpson-Wood is a professor of law at Barry University School of Law,
Orlando, Florida. She received her BFA from the Goodman School of Drama at
DePaul University and her JD (magna cum laude) and LLM in Admiralty (with
distinction) from Tulane Law School. She currently teaches in the areas of civil
procedure, conflict of laws, federal jurisdiction, popular culture & the law, and
admiralty & maritime Law.
1 147 CONG. REC. S13871-01 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
2 Stephen E. Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 60 (2002). Senator
Hollings was a sponsor of the Port and Maritime Security Act.
Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, 76
(2000), available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/archive/library/seaportl200.
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ports.4 This lack of effective port security existed despite the radical
change that had taken place in international shipping with the advent of
containerization and the attendant rise of a global economy. 6 In 2000,
the warnings of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in
U.S. Ports (the "Commission") that "U.S. seaports are vulnerable to
terrorist attacks, and such attacks have the potential to create substantial
damage to seaport infrastructure, with significant national security
consequences" went unheeded.7 The U.S. government also ignored the

pdf ("The maritime mode does not exhibit a substantial security or anti-terrorism
profile, particularly when compared with the emphasis commercial aviation places on
these activities. The primary reason for this situation is historical. In the U.S.
experience, aviation, particularly in an overseas environment, has been by far the most
visible and dramatic transportation target for terrorism and violent criminal incidents.
Few similar actual incidents involving domestic surface transportation assets have
occurred. Thus, each mode has responded to its own specific security and terrorist
history, and has developed and implemented security practices that are consistent with
its actual and assessed vulnerabilities. Additionally, the open nature of the maritime
environment makes it difficult, if not impractical, to apply security measures that
would hinder the movements of individuals. However, the increase in the potential
threat to these facilities in recent years is reason to review this situation.").
4 See id. (noting the U.S. government's emphasis on aviation security as opposed to
maritime security); STEPHEN E. FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE 39-40 (2004)
(explaining that the U.S. government's focus is on guarding the United States from a
potential missile attack rather than protecting its ports).
See Robert G. Clyne, Terrorism and Port/Cargo Security: Developments and
Implications for Marine Cargo Recoveries, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1183, 1187-88 (noting
that despite the fact that "[m]illions of containers pass through U.S. ports each year ... ,
[port] security was never a central focus of maritime commerce until the World Trade
Center attack on September 11th").
6 See MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 2 (2006) ("The container made
shipping cheap, and by doing so changed the shape of the world economy."); see also
Jeremy Firestone & James Corbett, Maritime Transportation: A Third Way for Port
and Environmental Security, 9 WIDNER L. SYMP. J. 419, 420-21 (2003) ("[T]he
country's port security focus remained narrow even in the face of three major changes
in maritime transportation: (a) containerized transport revolutionized international
shipping and allowed for seamless inter-modal transfer of cargo to trucks, railcars and
pipelines; (b) the world rushed toward global trade and tourism in the 1990s with its
attendant environmental, economic and cultural consequences; and (c) ports came to
be seen as major gateways to global commerce and engines of economic growth.").
Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports,
supra note 3, at 71.
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Commission's additional conclusion that "threats of chemical or
biological assault could represent an emerging issue for national
infrastructure systems such as seaports" and its recommendation "that
minimum port security guidelines should be developed" in line with its
findings.8
Just two months before the attacks on 9/11, the Acting Deputy
Administrator of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration ("MARAD") 9 echoed the Commission's report while
testifying before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.to He noted that unlike "U.S. airports and land border
crossings [that] have well structured security measures, our ports do not
enjoy the same level of security even though they offer unparalleled
intermodal access to our nation's interior."II Irrespective of such
warnings, prior to the attack on the World Trade Center, the goals of
port security were primarily to prevent cargo theft, counteract drug
smuggling, and control any stowaway problems.12
In addition, pre-9/11 budgetary constraints basically hamstrung
the U.S. Coast Guard.13 As it does today,14 in 2001 the U.S. Coast
Id. at 71, 75.
9 An agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation, MARAD provides programs
that "promote the use of waterbome transportation and its seamless integration with
other segments of the transportation system, and the viability of the U.S. merchant
8

marine."
About
ADMINISTRATION,

Us, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MARITIME
http://www.marad.dot.gov/about-us landingpage/about-us_

landing page.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). In addition, the Agency "works in many
areas involving ships and shipping, shipbuilding, port operations, vessel operations,
national security, environment, and safety." Id. It also is responsible for maintaining
"a fleet of cargo ships in reserve to provide surge sealift during war and national
emergencies." Id.
10 Crime and Security Issues Involving U.S. Seaports: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. 16-17 (2001) (statement of Bruce J.
Carlton, Acting Deputy, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation).
Id. (emphasis added).
I2

See id

FLYNN, supra note 4, at 42 ("The Coast Guard is charged with protecting 95,000
miles of shoreline and an 'Exclusive Economic Zone' that extends two hundred miles
off-shore covering 3.36 million square miles, with a force about the same size as the
New York police department, deployed on a fleet of vessels that are among the oldest
'
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Guard played a major role in securing the safety of 361 public seaports
and patrolling 95,000 miles of coastline prior to 9/11.15 The day before
the terrorist attacks, lack of funding had not only reduced the number of
coastguardsmen, but also forced crewmembers to rely on used parts to
make their cutters and aircraft operational.1 6 Unsurprisingly, the
security rating of American ports prior to 2001 was "generally fair to
poor." 7
In the aftermath of 9/11, while the safety of air travel continues
to take center stage,' 8 there is a growing recognition that seaports make

of thirty-seven navies around the world. Serious engineering casualties among its
ancient fleet of cutters and aircraft are routine. And while the Coast Guard was
handed more to do throughout the 1990s, from interdicting drugs and migrants to
patrolling dangerously depleted fishing grounds, on the eve of 9/11, its force was
pared back to its lowest level since the mid-1960s.").
14 See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 424 ("Historically, the Coast Guard has
been the leading player in port security and port state control .... ); Clyne, supra note
5, at 1188 (Prior to 9/11, "no central authority governed the activities and conduct at
U.S. ports").
15 U.S. COAST GUARD, C.G. PUB. 3-0, OPERATIONS § 3.1 (2012), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/CGPub_3_0.pdf ("The United States claims
sovereignty over 3.4 million nautical square miles of maritime territory, which
comprises the MTS [Marine Transportation System]. The MTS includes 95,000 miles
of coastline and 361 ports, from the largest mega-ports to the smallest fishing harbors
and marinas. The MTS also includes the system of interconnected inland rivers and
the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW), which consists of 12,000 miles of navigable waters
connecting inland metropolitan areas, industrial complexes, and the agricultural
heartland of the country. The MTS includes the Great Lakes, along 6,700 miles of
U.S. coastline and 1,500 miles of international maritime border with Canada, that
connect the industrial north and northern population centers of the Midwest through
the St. Lawrence Seaway System to the Atlantic Ocean.").
16 Flynn, supra note 2, at 60. ("[A]fter a decade of budgetary neglect, the U.S. Coast
Guard . . . was forced to reduce its ranks to the lowest level since 1964 and to

cannibalize its decades-old cutters and aircraft for spare parts to keep others
operational.").
17 Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports,
supra note 3, at 119 ("Security measures and limits to access to seaports and terminals
vary from port to port but are generally fair to poor.").
18 See Judy Woodruff & Tom Bearden, DrasticChanges in Airport SecurityAfter 9/11
Stir Controversy (PBS NewsHour broadcast Sept. 8, 2011), available at
(noting
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec 11/safeskies_09-08.html
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tempting targets for terrorists and that the nation's seaports must be
secured.19 Logically, the attraction of insecure ports as favored terrorist
targets has increased exponentially as U.S. airport security has
tightened. 20 In particular, the risk of a maritime terrorist attack against
container shipping is on the rise.21 In the post-9/1 1 world, it is clear that
continuing to address port vulnerabilities is critical to ensuring the
safety of U.S. ports.2 2
On March 28, 2013, MARAD reported an increase in the
number of vessels stopping or "calling" at U.S. ports. 23 "In 2011, 7,662
oceangoing vessels made 67,929 calls at U.S. ports."2 4 Of these calls,
thirty-three percent were by containerships. 25 Los Angeles 26 and Long

the drastic aviation security measures the U.S. government has taken in the post-9/11
world).
19 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-1009T, MARITIME SECURITY:
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 10 YEARS AFTER THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY ACT

(2012)

[hereinafter

GAO MARITIME

SECURITY],

available at

http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647999.pdf ("GAO's work has shown that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its component agencies,
particularly the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have
made substantial progress in implementing various programs that, collectively, have
improved maritime security." These "programs fall[] under four areas: (1) security
planning, (2) port facility and vessel security, (3) maritime domain awareness and
information sharing, and (4) international supply chain security."); see also JON D.
HAVEMAN & HOWARD J. SHATZ, PROTECTING THE NATION'S SEAPORTS: BALANCING

SECURITY AND COST 3-4 (Haveman et al. eds., 2006) (explaining the need for

increased port security in a post-9/11 world); John W. Schoen, Ships and Ports Are
Terrorism's New Frontier, NBC News (June 21, 2004, 10:20 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5069435/ (explaining the vulnerability of U.S. maritime
ports in comparison to U.S. airports).
20 See Schoen, supra note 19.

21 See FLYNN, supra note 4, at 90-93 (noting how easily terrorists could attack the
United States by targeting containers shipped into U.S. maritime ports).
22 See Crime and Security Issues Involving U.S. Seaports: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., supra note 10 (explaining the need for
increased security at U.S. maritime ports).
23 Ray H. LaHood & David T. Matsuda, Vessel Calls Snapshot, 2011, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN. 1 (Mar. 2013), http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Vessel_
CallsatUSPorts_Snapshot.pdf.
24 Id.
25

id

76

Florida CoastalLaw Review

[Vol. 15:71

Beach were the top ports for containership calls, followed by the ports
of: New York, San Francisco, Virginia, Savannah, Charleston, Port
Everglades, Miami, Houston, and Seattle. 27 Altogether, more than "2
billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo" is handled annually
by U.S. waterways and ports. 28
Total container traffic in the United States "doubled in volume
between 1995 and 2007" and "rose at an average annual percentage rate
of [four] percent" between 1995 and 2009.29 By the year 2020, it is
expected that "the total volume of cargo shipped by water" will be
double the volume shipped in 2001.30 As of 2011, U.S. container traffic
"account[ed] for [nine] percent of worldwide container traffic," and
"[one] container in every [eleven] that carries global trade is bound for
or originates in the United States." 3 1 Currently, the container ports in
North America "handle more than 35 million containers per year." 32
These figures make the United States "the world's largest trading
[n]ation, with the world's biggest economy." 33
Considered a megaport, "[t]he Port of Los Angeles has nine major container
terminals and four dockside intermodal rail yards with direct access to the Alameda
Corridor, a 20-mile express railway connecting the Port to the rail hubs in downtown
Los Angeles."
See Container Facilities, THE PORT OF Los ANGELES,
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/facilities/container.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
For an excellent article discussing the changes that have occurred in ship technology
and the rise of the megaport to service megacontainer ships, see Rod Vulovic,
Changing Ship Technology and Port InfrastructureImplications, INDUSTRY-DRIVEN
CHANGES AND POLICY RESPONSES, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/
natdiapdf/9vulovic.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
27 LaHood & Matsuda, supra
note 23, at 6.
28 U.S. Port Industry, AM.
ASS'N OF PORT AUTHS., http://www.aapaports.org/industry/content.cfm?itemnumber-1022&navitemnumber-901 (last visited
Sept. 17, 2013).
29 Long-Term Trends in Container Throughput, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. RES. &
INNOVATIVE
TECH.
ADMIN.
BUREAU
OF
TRANSP.
STATISTICS
(2011),
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/americas-container
_ports/20 11/html/longterm trends.html.
30 U.S. PortIndustry, supra
note 28.
Long-Term Trends in Container Throughput, supra note 29.
32 Joan M. Bondareff & Patricia O'Neill, Are Our Ports Safe?,
MAR. REPORTER &
MARINE NEWS, July 19, 2013, http://www.marinelink.com/news/ports-safe-are
356776.aspx.
33 Long-Term Trends in Container Throughput, supra note 29.
26
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Some predict that the size and number of containerships will
increase. 34 According to a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report, over
the next couple of decades there will be a steady increase in the number
of containerships of all sizes. 35
Vessels exceeding 12,000 TEUs [twenty-foot equivalent
units], which did not even exist in 2000, will jump from
47 in 2011 to 232 in 2020, and to 458 in 2030. Vessels
in the 7,600 to 12,000 TEU range are expected to follow
a similar growth pattern, going from zero in 2000, to 291
in 2011, to 515 in 2020, and to 742 ships in 2030.36
As the number and size of containerships increases, so does the
potential for a terrorist attack.37 For between $3,000 to $5,000,38 groups
like al-Qaeda could rent an international container, pack items weighing

34 Id.; see also Keith Norbury, Big, Young Ships Flex ContainerMuscles: Canadian
Ports Brace for Impact of Super-Sized Container Vessels, CANADIAN SAILING

& LOGISTICS, http://www.canadiansailings.ca/?p=4605 (lasted visited Sept.
16, 2013, 3:58 PM) (discussing the building of more containerships in larger sizes).
3 See PLANNING & MGMT. CONSULTANTS, LTD., THE NATIONAL DREDGING NEEDS
TRANSP.

STUDY OF PORTS AND HARBORS-IMPLICATION TO COST-SHARING OF FEDERAL DEEP
DRAFT NAVIGATION PROJECTS DUE TO CHANGES IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 19
(Planning & Mgmt. Consultants, Ltd. ed., 2000) available at http://planning.usace.
army.mil/toolbox/library/IWRServer/00-R-8.pdf; see also Norbury, supra note 34.
36 Norbury, supra note 34.
37 See GAO MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 19 (statement of Stephen L. Caldwell,
Director of Homeland Security and Justice, that the vulnerability of ports to terrorist
attacks is due to the size and location of the ports); Eric J. Lobsinger, Post-9/11

Security in a Post-WWII World: The Question of Compatibility of Maritime Security
Efforts with Trade Rules and InternationalLaw, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 61, 62, 73 (2007)
(discussing how global-trading networks' increased dependence on ports and
containerships makes them particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks).

FLYNN, supra note 4, at 88 ("The challenge of securing the loading and movement
of containers is formidable. Anyone who has $3,000 to $5,000 can lease one of the
many millions of containers that circulate around the globe."); see International

Shipping Containers, SHIPPER WORLDWIDE (2013), http://www.shipperworldwide.
com/international-shipping-containers/ ("The shipping container cost varies depending
on whether a new or used container is purchased. New containers may cost over
$3,000, while a used container often goes for half that price. The prices of 40-foot
containers are quite a bit more expensive.") (emphasis removed).
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up to 65,000 pounds, 3 9 and secure the door with a seal costing anywhere
between thirty cents to a dollar for the top-of-the-line, high-security
container seal approved by the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (the "C-TPAT").4
A disruption in the global supply chain resulting from a terrorist
attack would have a devastating effect on the United States
economically. 4 1 For example, in 2012, the ports of Los Angeles and
Long Beach were closed to cargo container traffic when union clerical
workers went on strike and 10,000 longshoremen refused to cross the
picket lines. 42 It is estimated that the strike cost the U.S. economy more
than $650 million a day. 43 In 2002, a ten-day lockout at twenty-nine
3 See RULES FOR CERTIFICATION OF CARGO CONTAINERS 89 (American

Bureau of
Shipping ed. 1998), available at http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternalPortalWEB/
ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/Rules&Guides/Current/1 3_CertofCargoContainer
s/Publ3 CargoContainers (discussing how containers removed from ships to railcars
for shipping have a 65,000-pound design for efficient shipping capabilities); Bulk
Agricultural Intermodal Shipments Policies and Procedures, BNSF RY. (2013),
http://www.bnsf.com/customers/where-can-i-ship/overseas/bulk-ag-intermodalshipments.html (stating the different sizes and weight capacities of internationally
shipped containers that are available).
40 See High Security Container Seals Price, ALI EXPRESS, http://www.aliexpress.com/
price/high-security-container-seals-price.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2013, 9:28 AM)
(showing the various prices of the C-TPAT-approved cargo and container seals
available for purchase). For a more thorough discussion of the C-TPAT, see infra Part
II.B.3.a.ii.
41 See GAO MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 19, at 1; see also HAVEMAN & SHATZ,

supra note 19, at 6 (discussing how a terrorist attack on U.S. ports could disrupt the
economy because of the importance these ports have on trade); Stephen E. Flynn &
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, End of the Joyride: Confronting the New Homeland Security
Imperative in the Age of Globalization, A Paper Prepared for the Colloquium Series
on Border Control & Homeland Security 7 (Apr. 7, 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND
MG520.pdf (discussing how a "modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of
dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down" the ports due to a terrorist
attack); Schoen, supra note 19 (discussing the effects of a port shutdown on the U.S.
economy).
42 Talks Resume in L.A.-Long Beach HarborsStrike, CBSNEWS.COM (Nov. 30, 2012,
7:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57556432/talks-resume-in-l.a.long-beach-harbors-strike/.
43 Ian Lovett, Los Angeles and Long Beach Ports to Reopen After 8-Day Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/us/los-angeles-and-long-
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West Coast seaports "disrupted the itineraries of more than 200 ships
carrying 300,000 containers, resulting in cargo delays, costly diversions
to alternative ports, and unemployment lines as businesses laid off
workers and cut production."44 The estimated impact on the U.S.
economy ranged between $450 million4 5 to $15 billion in losses.46
Even more important than any economic impact is the potential for
environmental damage and the loss of human life from the use of
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.4 7
Part I of this Article provides a brief, historical overview of the
major U.S. port security regulations prior to 9/11. It then touches
briefly on the two key pieces of legislation relevant to container
security, the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002 (the
"MTSA") 48 and the Security and Accountability For Every ("SAFE")
Port Act.49 Next, it will examine the success and failure of three
primary, post-9/11, domestic, container-specific security measures
taken to increase port security: the Container Security Initiative (the
"CSI"),o the 100% cargo scanning rule,5 1 and the C-TPAT.5 2 It will

beach-ports-to-reopen-after-strike.html?_r-0;
HarborsStrike, supra note 42.

Talks Resume in L.A.-Long Beach

44 MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, PETER CHALK, HENRY H. WILLIS, IVAN KHILKO & DAVID

S. ORTIZ, MARITIME TERRORISM: RISK AND LIABILITY 122 (RAND Corp. ed., 2006),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND
MG520.pdf.
45 Id. at 122-23.
46 Talks Resume in L.A.-Long Beach HarborsStrike, supra note 42.
47 HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 2-3, 194 n.13 ("Beyond their economic role,
the largest seaports are also near major population centers, so the use of a weapon of
mass destruction at a port could injure or kill thousands of people.").
48 Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat.
2064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.,
and 46 U.S.C.).
49 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat.
1884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 33
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).
SOContainer Security Initiative, 6 U.S.C. § 945 (2012).
51 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, § 1701, 121 Stat. 266, 489 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 6 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 14 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
52 Custom-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, 6 U.S.C. §§ 961-973 (2012).
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also address the required biometric credential pursuant to the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential ("TWIC").5 3 Part III
traces the rise of the shipping container and discusses certain unique
cargo security issues resulting from the expansion of containerization.
The Article then considers the potential of terrorist stowaways to
breach current port security measures and threaten national security. In
concluding, the Article will make some suggestions about the course the
United States might want to chart in its ongoing effort to ensure the
security of the nation's seaports from the dangers that terroristcompromised cargo containers pose.
II.

A.

THE EVOLUTION OF PORT SECURITY REGULATIONS

A Brief Historical Overview ofPort Safety Regulations

Ensuring the safety of American ports is not a new idea. 5 4 it
existed long before "the war on terror" became part of our lexicon.5 5 In

5 46 U.S.C. § 70105 (2006); Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064.
54 See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 425-28 (providing a brief overview of port
security in the United States since 1789).
It is interesting to note that despite the Obama administration's preference for
alternative language, the phrase "war on terror" has retained its popularity. See Katy
Steinmetz, The Long War Over "The War on Terror", TIME SWAMPLAND, (Feb. 15,

2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/02/15/the-long-war-over-the-war-on-terror/#
ixzz2PPZhTsFW.
Soon after he took office in 2009, Obama purposefully stopped
using one of his predecessor's favorite catchphrases. Neither the
President nor his counterterrorism team publically referred to the
global war on terror....

Obama started explaining his distaste for the phrase in his
presidency's early days. "It is very important for us to recognize
that we have a battle or a war against some terrorist organizations,"
he said in a February 2009 interview on CNN.
Despite the Obama Administration's public advocacy against
the term, news outlets still use the terminology with abandon, too...
. In a 2009 memo to Pentagon staffers, the Defense Department's
Office of Security asked speechwriters to use "overseas contingency
operation. .

. ."

But everyman folks don't sit in a booth at a diner

downtown and chat about "CVE."
War on terror "sums up an idea in the public mind," says
Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the National Security
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1790, Alexander Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, created the
Revenue Cutter Service, the forerunner of the modem day U.S. Coast
Guard.5 6 While it is often thought that the main purpose of the service
was to thwart attempts to smuggle cargo in order to avoid paying
customs taxes, Congress assigned many and varied duties to the
Revenue Cutter Service. 57 The duties ranged from "co-operating with
the navy in time of war"58 to "suppressing mutinies aboard merchant
vessels." 59 The Revenue Cutter Service was "required to strictly
enforce all statues relating to the maritime interests of the country." 60
In 1916, while the United States was still maintaining a position
of neutrality in an attempt to stay out of World War I, what was
arguably the first foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil occurred in New
York Harbor on Black Tom Island. 6 1 "[O]n July 30, 1916, [pro-German
saboteurs] ...

blew up a munitions depo on Black Tom Island ...

decimat[ing] 13 warehouses on [the island], devastat[ing] Jersey City
and destroy[ing] property in Manhattan. Five people-plus vagrants
sleeping on barges in the harbor-perished." 62 It was estimated that

Network, a think tank in Washington, D.C. "It's very specific and
correct about what Americans wanted to defeat [after 9/11]." As
intellectually inaccurate as it might be to wage war on a tactic,
Hurlburt says, the threat of terrorism is exactly what Americans
wanted to be rid of after the towers fell.
Id. (alteration in original).
56 The United States Coast GuardAcademy, A Brief History, U.S. COAST GUARD 2,
http://www.uscg.mil/history/uscghist/uscgahistory final.pdf.
In 1915, Congress
formed the U.S. Coast Guard when it combined the Revenue Cutter Service with the
civilian Life Savings Service. Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 425.
5 See John W. Collins, The United States Revenue Cutter Service, XV CASSIER'S
MAGAZINE, Apr. 1899, at 373, 376 (explaining some of the duties that Congress
assigned to the United States Revenue Cutter Service).
58

Id.

s Id. at 377.
60

Id. at 376-77.

See Glenn C. Altschuler, A TerroristAttack on the City, 85 Years Before
Sept. 11,
THE N.Y. OBSERVER (July 17, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://observer.com/2006/07/aterrorist-attack-on-the-city-85-years-before-sept-ll/ (providing an overview of the
terrorist attack on New York Harbor on July 30, 1916).
62 Id.
61

FloridaCoastalLaw Review

82

[Vol. 15:71

damages were around $20 million (approximately $350 million
today).6 3
In response, Congress passed the 1917 Espionage Act 64 under
which the U.S. Coast Guard was charged with the protection of
"waterfront property, supervision of vessel movements, establishment
of anchorages and restricted areas, and the right to control and remove
people aboard ships" during time of war. 65 For the first time, the U.S.
Coast Guard was responsible for the security of American waterways
and ports.66 Then, with the onset of the Korean War, the Magnuson Act
empowered the President to take action under the Espionage Act of
1917 whenever there was a perceived threat to the national security of
the United States and enlarged the U.S. Coast Guard's mission to an
ongoing duty "to safeguard U.S. ports, harbors, vessels, and waterfront
facilities from accidents, sabotage, or other subversive acts." 67
In 1972, Congress implemented additional regulations in the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 68 which required specific agencies to
regulate U.S. ships, navigable waters, ports, and port facilities by
implementing certain procedures to prevent accidents, negligence, and

sabotage.69

63

Id.; see generally CHAD MILLMAN, THE DETONATORS:

THE SECRET PLOT TO

2006)
Tom
Island
up
to
the
Black
the
events
leading
account
of
(providing a detailed
followed).
events
that
and
the
how
it
happened,
terrorist attack,
64 Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
792-799 (2006).
65 Robert
Scheina, The Coast Guard at War, U.S. COAST GUARD,
http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/hCGatwar.asp (last modified Oct. 11, 2012).
66 Firestone & Corbett, supra note
6, at 425.
67 Missions:
Maritime Security, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/top/
missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp (last modified Sept. 12, 2013); Magnuson Act 1950,
64 Stat. 427-28 (currently codified at 50 U.S.C. § 191); see also Exec. Order No.
10,173, 15 Fed. Reg. 7005 (Oct. 18, 1950) (where provisions for port security were
added to).
68 Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972), amending 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1936)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 and 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. 11 1972)) (currently
codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (2006)).
69 See Mark S. Davis, The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972: An Expansion of
the FederalApproach to Oil Pollution,6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 250-53 (1974-1975).
DESTROY AMERICA AND AN EPic HUNT FOR JUSTICE (Little, Brown & Co.
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Congress passed another key piece of pre-9/1 1 legislation after
the tragedy that occurred aboard the passenger vessel Achille Lauro.
"On Oct[ober] 7, 1985, the Italian cruise ship MS Achille Lauro was
hijacked by four members of the Palestine Liberation Front off the coast
of Egypt in the Mediterranean." 70 "The hijackers took the more than
400 passengers and crew members hostage and demanded the release of
50 Palestinians from Israeli prisons."71 The next day, after being denied
permission to dock at the port of Tartus, the hijackers executed one of
the hostages, Leon Klinghoffer, a sixty-nine-year-old, disabled, Jewish
American, and tossed him overboard in his wheelchair in front of his
wife, Marilyn. 72 In response, Congress enacted the 1986 International
Maritime and Port Security Act.73 The Act authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to assess terrorist threats to U.S. ports74 and vessels and
to take the appropriate actions to prevent and respond to any acts of
terrorism against vessels, structures, or individuals subject to U.S.
jurisdiction.7 5

70 The Learning Network, Oct. 7, 1985 | Palestinian Gunmen Hijack Achille Lauro,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2011, 4:12 AM), http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/
oct-7-1985-palestinian-gunmen-hijack-achille-lauro/?_r-0 (italics added).
7' id.

72 Id. "The hijackers surrendered on the condition that they and the hijacking
mastermind Abu Abbas be given a plane to escape." Id. "However, on Oct[ober] 10,
the plane was intercepted by United States military aircraft and forced to land at a
NATO base in Sicily, where Mr. Abbas and the hijackers were arrested." Id. "The
American and Italian governments argued over jurisdiction to prosecute the hijackers."
Id. "Italy would not extradite the men to the United States and, though it did convict
the four hijackers, allowed Mr. Abbas to escape to Yugoslavia." Id. "He remained a
free man until 2003, when he was captured by United States troops in Iraq; he died in
custody the following year." Id.
73 International and Port Security Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 889 (1986)
(codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1801-1809 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) and 33 U.S.C. §
1226 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
74 This recognition has not been limited to the United States. Rather, there is now a
global recognition of the need for "a new international legal framework to safeguard
world shipping interests, protect coastal populations from the threat of surreptitious
seaborne attack, and to assure trading partners of ship and cargo security." L. Stephen
Cox, The Advent and Future ofInternationalPortSecurity Law, 1 NAT'L SEC. L. J. 77,
77 (2013).
7 See Firestone & Corbett, supra note 6, at 426.
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Post-9/11 Domestic Security Initiatives Regarding Cargo
Containers
Key Legislation

In the wake of 9/11, the United States realized the vulnerability
of its seaports and vessels to a new brand of twenty-first century
terror.7 6 With that realization came vigorous efforts to quickly adopt
innovative security measures in the United States and a call for the
recognition that it was time to embrace an international approach,
particularly regarding vessel, port, and cargo security.
There are two pieces of key legislation relating to container
security. 78 The basis for any discussion of U.S. homeland security must
begin with the extensive restructuring of the U.S. government in
November of 2002, resulting in the enactment of the Homeland Security
Act. 79 This Act gave birth to a new U.S. executive department, the
Department of Homeland Security (the "DHS").80 In March of 2003,
Congress reorganized the U.S. Customs Service and renamed it as U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (the "CBP"). 1 This Agency now falls

76

See FLYNN, supra note 4, at 87.

n Id. at 91 ("We have to recognize that the networks we rely on today are integrated
into much larger continental and global systems.").
78 While the focus of this Article is on certain protocols for tracking
and screening
cargo, there are a number of excellent pieces of scholarship with detailed discussions
covering additional pieces of legislation and executive orders concerning homeland
security stemming from the attacks on 9/11. See, e.g., Rachael B. Bralliar, Protecting
U.S. Ports with Layered Security Measures for ContainerShips, 185 MIL. L. REV. 1
(2005); Robert G. Clyne, Terrorism and Port/Cargo Security: Developments and
Implications for Marine Cargo Recoveries, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1183 (2003); Katie S.
Matison, What's in the Box?, 76 J. OF TRANSP. L., LOGISTICS & POL'Y 329 (2009); K.

Lamar Walters 111, Industry on Alert: Legal and Economic Ramifications of the
Homeland Security Act on Maritime Commerce, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 311 (2006).
7 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-195c (2012).
80 Id. § 111; Owen Bishop, A "Secure" Package?Maritime Cargo ContainerSecurity
After 9/11, 29 TRANSP. L.J., 313, 314 (2002).
81 See JOHN F. FRITELLI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31733, PORT AND MARITIME

SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 (2005), available at http://

www.maritimeterrorism.com/2005/05/27/port-and-maritime-security-background-andissues-for-congress/.
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within the DHS and is responsible for managing, controlling, and
securing the borders of the United States. 82 Congress also relocated the
U.S. Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the DHS."
a.

The MTSA

The first piece of legislation that Congress enacted following
9/11 in an effort to secure U.S. ports was the 2002 MTSA." The Act
requires, or empowers, the DHS to conduct comprehensive threat and
vulnerability assessments at critical ports including local threat profiles
and evaluations of all aspects of security in the surrounding area." The
general approach of the MTSA to port security is multitiered. 86 Experts
have concluded that the most effective defense is one that is layered and
This
includes both national and international security measures."
approach is essential when it comes to cargo security measures due to
the variety of goods transported in containers aboard a cargo ship8 8 and
Id. (discussing the role of the CBP). Notably, "[p]rior to the establishment of the
CBP, customs and immigration functions at U.S. borders were conducted separately
by the Department of Treasury's U.S. Customs Service and the Department of
Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id.
83 Bralliar, supra note 78, at 39.
84 Joann Peterson & Alan Treat, The Post 9/11 Global Framework
for Cargo Security,
2 J. INT'L COM. & EcoN. 1, 11 (2009); Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70125 (2006)).
See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
8 46 U.S.C. §§ 70102-70103.
United States Relating to International Law, Establishment of U.S. Antiterrorism
Maritime Transportation System, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 588-89 (2004) (explaining
what the MTSA requires of the DHS).
86 See Bralliar,supra note 78, at 4, 38-63; Wendy J. Keefer, Container Port Security:
A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply
Chain, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 139, 139 (2007) (discussing the multilayered security
measures used to secure containers entering the United States).
87 See FLYNN, supra note 4, at 69 (endorsing a multitiered approach and admonishing
that "[a]nyone who claims they have developed the solution to a security challenge
Effective security always requires
should be met with automatic skepticism.
constructing layers of measures. Each of these layers may be imperfect, but
collectively they increase the odds of tripping up the bad guys."); FRITELLI, supra note
81, at 18 (stating that experts recommend relying "on a layered approach with multiple
lines of defense").
88 See Bralliar,supra note 78, at 10-11 ("The volume and multiple sources providing
cargo in maritime containers transported overseas, as well as the potential anonymity
82
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the number of individuals and countries that may be involved in
shipping a container from a foreign port to the United States.
b.

The SAFEPortAct

In 2006, Congress enacted the SAFE Port Act to supplement and
strengthen perceived weaknesses of the MTSA. 90 Like the MTSA, the
SAFE Port Act advocates the layered approach to port security.91 It
also prescribes the steps that must be taken to create a strategic plan to
secure "the international supply chain." 92 The linchpin of this global
supply chain is the container.9 3
An interesting wrinkle has also arisen as to whether it is safe for
port security to be "SMART." The House of Representatives passed a
bill on June 28, 2012, that it introduced as H.R. 4251 in March of 2012,
but the Senate never passed the bill.9 4 The legislation, entitled the

of such contents, make containers and container ships easy targets for terrorist. These
vulnerabilities make containers and container ships unique security threats.").
89 See FRITELLI, supra note 81, at 8 (Individuals connected to a container shipment
"usually include the exporter, the importer, a freight forwarder, a customs broker, a
customs inspector, inland transportation provider(s) (which may include more than
one trucker or railroad), the port operators, possibly a feeder ship [a smaller cargo
container vessel that travels between a megaship and the port of destination], and the
ocean carrier.").
90 The SAFE Port Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006); see GAO
MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 19, at 1, 3 (explaining what the SAFE Port Act
required of the DHS).
' 6 U.S.C. § 941(a) (2012) ("The Secretary, in consultation with appropriate Federal,
State, local, and tribal government agencies and private sector stakeholders
responsible for security matters that affect or relate to the movement of containers
through the international supply chain, shall develop, implement, and update, as
appropriate, a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international supply
chain.").
92 § 941(b)-(f).
93 See § 941(a)-(f).
94 See Ryan Hatley, Could "SMART Port Security" Reverse "SAFE Port Security"?,
NAT'L SEC. L. BRIEF (Nov. 21, 2012), http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/couldsmart-port-security-reverse-safe-port-security/; H.R. 4251 (112th): Securing Maritime
Activities through Risk-based Targeting for Port Security Act, GOVTRACK.US,
(last visited Sept. 15, 2013)
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/l12/hr4251
(providing information as to the status and history of the bill).
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Securing Maritime Activities through Risk-Based Targeting for Port
Security Act (the "SMART Port Security Act"), authorized "the
Homeland Security Department to acknowledge as acceptable foreign
nations' Trusted Shipper Programs." 95 The SMART Port Security Act
was supposed to build on the 2006 SAFE Port Act with the goal of the
legislation to assist the United States in "streamlining and
improving . . . efforts to prevent dangerous materials that could be used
in a terrorist attack from entering the country through its port system." 96
Arguably, the SMART Port Security Act would also have "neutralize[d]
many provisions of the SAFE Port Act by allowing the executive
branch to recognize another country's [Trusted Shipper] port security
measures as sufficient." 97 The ramifications of such authority could
result in the United States "rely[ing] on the security measures at a
[United Arab Emirates] managed port ... if the United States Coast
Guard recognizes their port security threat assessments as sufficient." 98
In essence, it is as if the United Arab Emirates could manage a U.S. port
in terms of the enforceable security measures. 99 This permits an end
run around the provision of the SAFE Port Act that "changed the ExonFlorio Amendment ... to require the executive branch to perform a 45day investigation of each foreign investment deal" absent an agreement
by "the Secretary of Transportation and the head of the lead agency on
the transaction . .. that there is no threat to national security."100

House Approves New Ship Cargo Screening Bill, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
(June 29, 2012), http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/house-approves-new-ship-cargoscreening-bill/.
96 Id.; Jeff Berman, NFR Voices Supportfor the SMART Port Security Act, LOGISTICS
MGMT. (June 6, 2012), http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/nrf voices support_
forthesmartport securityact/ (stating that the Act "encourage[s] DHS to really
identify where the current supply chain security gaps are and determine what is needed
to fill those gaps in").
9 Hatley, supra note 94.
9

98 Id.

9 See id.
1oo Id.
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The Agencies

The principal players in fulfilling the success of the layered
0 the U.S. Coast Guard,
approach to container security are the DHS;o'
which is responsible for providing security on the water and regulating
and inspecting vessels that enter U.S. ports;102 and the CBP, which has
the primary duty of examining and inspecting cargo and cargo
containers shipped to the United States aboard foreign vessels.1 03 Each
of these enforcement authorities has instituted various security measures
that specifically relate to securing shipping containers. 104 There is a
fourth agency that plays a role in the security of domestic maritime
transportation, the Transportation and Security Administration (the
"TSA"). 0 5 Originally seen as an agency focused on security in the
aviation area, the TSA now plays a significant role in cargo container
security by its oversight of the TWIC initiative.' 06
3.

The Programs

There are four key programs set forth in the MTSA and the
SAFE Port Act that are critical to the creation of the multilayered
approach to container security.lo7 First, to increase security, the MTSA

101

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See Bralliar,supra note 78, at 43-44 (discussing the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in
fulfilling the tenets of the MTSA).
103 Id. at 39-40 (stating that the CBP also is responsible for "examining
and inspecting
the crew members and passengers on ships arriving in U.S. ports from foreign ports.");
see FRITELLI, supra note 81, at 3 (discussing the physical inspection by the CBP of
maritime containers).
104 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (explaining each agency's security
measures).
105 FRITELLI, supra note 81, at 9-10 (citing the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)) ("TSA is an agency created by
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001.").
106 See id. at 20; Ben Brandt, Terrorist Threats to Commercial Aviation:
A
102

Contemporary Assessment, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT W. POINT (Nov. 30,

2011),
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-threats-to-commercial-aviation-acontemporary-assessment.
107 See Deputy Commissioner Testifies on Cargo and Border Security Issues, U.S.
CusTOMs

&

BORDER

PROT.

(Apr.

2,

2008),

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
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requires the development of the TWIC.108 Second, the SAFE Port Act
codified the CSI and the C-TPAT.10 9 It also required that all containers
entering high-volume U.S. ports be scanned for radiation sources by
December 31, 2007.110

a.

The SAFE PortAct
i.

The CSI

In January 2002, the CBP launched the CSI.1 There are four
core elements to the CSI: "(1) using intelligence and automated
information to identify and target high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening
those containers identified as high-risk, at the port of departure, before
they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using detection technology to quickly prescreen high-risk containers; and (4) using smarter, tamper proof
containers."l12 The overarching intent of the CSI is to "extend our zone
of security outward so that American borders are the last line of
defense, not the first."' 1 3
According to the CSI 2006-2011 Strategic Plan,l 1 4 the purpose
of the CSI is "to pre-screen[] containers posing a potential security risk

newsroom/con res/ref rec/congressional test/con test_110/border secuirty testify.xm
(setting out and discussing in detail the components of the multilayered approach).
108 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-86T, MARITIME
SECURITY: THE
SAFE PORT ACT AND EFFORTS TO SECURE OUR NATION'S SEAPORTS 1, (2007)

(statement of Steven L. Caldwell, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0886t.pdf.
109Id. at 2.

110 Id.
1 ContainerSecurity Initiative Expands Beyond the Megaports, Strengthening AntiTerror Coalition, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Jan. 28, 2003),
http://www.cbp.gov/archived/xp/cgov/newsroom/news-releases/archives/cbp_press

releases/0 12003/01282003.xml.html.
112

Id.

"3 Container Security Initiative (CSI),
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.
globalsecurity.org/security/ops/csi.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
114 Container Security Initiative: 2006-2011 Strategic Plan, U.S. CUSTOMS
&

BORDER PROT. (Aug. 2006),
spotlight/i 006/csiplan.pdf.

available at http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/

90
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before they leave foreign ports for U.S. seaports."' 15 To implement the
strategic plan, the "CBP deploys multi-disciplined teams to selected
foreign seaports of countries that have bilaterally agreed to implement
the CSI program."ll 6 The CSI officials then "partner with foreign
governments to identify cargo containers that pose a potential risk for
terrorism and inspect those containers at the foreign ports before they
are shipped to the United States."' '7 Originally, the CSI was
operational "at the [top twenty] ports that sen[t] large volumes of cargo
containers to the United States, in a way that will facilitate detection of
potential security concerns at ports of origin or transshipment." 118
Today, the CBP has expanded the CSI to include fifty-eight ports,
which make up approximately eighty-five percent of the containers
headed to the United States.' '9
Primarily, the CSI relies upon the CBP "24-hour manifest
rule."'
Effective December 2, 2002, this rule requires carriers and
non-vessel-operating common carriers to submit a cargo declaration to
the CBP twenty-four hours before cargo is laden aboard the vessel at a
foreign port. 121
20

Consequently, the main weakness of the CSI, like the other tiers
in the layered approach to cargo security, is its grounding in "data flow.

115
116

Id. (Introduction by Commissioner W. Ralph Basham).
Id. at 6.

Id.
U.S. Expands Container Security Initiative to Sweden, IIP DIGITAL,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/01/20030129132511 azwaniec
ki@pd.state.govO. 1734735.html#axzz2epMg8m4b (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
117

119Container

Security

Initiative

Ports,

DEP'T

OF

HOMELAND

SEC.,

http://www.dhs.gov/container-security-initiative-ports (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
12o See Jim Giermanski, Closing Gaps in the ContainerSecurity Initiative: Why the
CSI ProgramDoesn't Go FarEnough and What Can Be Done to Fix It, SECURITY
INFOWATCH.COM
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/
10483219/closing-gaps-in-the-container-security-initiative?page=2;
Keefer, supra
note 86, at 157.
121 Joann Peterson & Alan Treat, The Post-9/11 Global Framework for Cargo
Security, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N J. OF INT'L COM. & ECON., Mar. 2008, at 1, 11-

12, availableat http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/cargosecurity.pdf.
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Its validity is only as good as the accuracy of the data submitted."1 2 2 To
identify containers to screen, the CBP employs "automated targeting
tools" to determine which containers are high risk "based upon advance
information and strategic intelligence." 23 Further, the "CBP officers
are only allowed to physically inspect containers in the participating
foreign country ports when authorized to do so by that nation's customs
authorities."l 24 Absent the permission to actually examine the cargo,
the CBP officers use nonintrusive inspection methods, i.e., mobile
gamma-ray imaging technology and radiation technology, to screen
high-risk containers.125 This raises the additional criticism that the CSI
is weak because it results in the inspectors generally "not really
knowing the contents of the container." 2 6 There is also a problem that
the "nonintrusive inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in
detection capability .. ..

As a result, the CBP has limited assurance

that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and
identifying terrorist [weapons of mass destruction] in containers."1 27
ii.

The C-TPAT

In contrast to the CSI, which is at least founded on the logical
premise of "extend[ing] our zone of security outward so that American
borders are the last line of defense, not the first," arguably, the C-TPAT
does not have a sound foundation.128 The DHS and the CBP developed
the C-TPAT as a voluntary government-business initiative premised on

122 James Giermanski, Container Security: Is the LayeredApproach Working?, CSO
(June 25, 2008), http://www.csoonline.com/article/411113/container-security-is-thelayered-approach-working- (discussing the statement of Deputy Commissioner of the
CBP, Jayson P. Ahern, made before the Committee on Appropriations on April 2,
2008).
123 Id.
124

id

125 Id.
126

id

127 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, GAO-05-466T,

HOMELAND

SECURITY:

KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED (2005) (testimony of Richard

M. Stana, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05466t.pdf; see also Bralliar,supra note 78, at 62-63
(discussing the inadequate implementation and enforcement mechanisms of the CSI).
128 ContainerSecurity Initiative (CSI), supra note 123.
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the concept of quid pro quo.1 29 If shippers agree "to adopt and integrate
the program's security guidelines into their supply chains," they receive
certification as "trusted" or "known" shippers.' 30 This changes the risk
factor of their goods.131 The primary problem with the C-TPAT is that
it basically gives shippers who provide information about their
operations to the CBP "an 'E-Z Pass' from [the U.S.] government, sort
of like drivers who speed right through toll booths without having to
stop." 32 In other words, their goods are less likely to be subject to
extensive inspection.133
Further, it appears that "[the CBP] grants these special benefits
without verifying that the security information provided by the shippers
[] is reliable, accurate and effective."l 34 According to a Government
Accounting Office (the "GAO") report in 2005, the CBP's validation
process was not "rigorous" and did not have "written guidelines to
indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation."' 35 In
addition, the CBP had not developed a comprehensive set of
performance measures for the program; furthermore, key program
decisions "[were] not always documented and programmatic
information [was] not updated regularly or accurately." 36
The program has been criticized as taking "a complacent posture
towards port security by giving companies the benefit of speedy

129

Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-TradePartnershipAgainst Terrorism

(C-TPAT) Strategic Plan, CUSTOMS

& BORDER

PATROL

12

(Nov.

2004),

http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ctpat-strat-plan_3.pdf (last visited
Oct. 23, 2013).
130 Supply Chain Security Programsand Issues, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, available
at http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues/security/cargo-and-the-supply-chain/
supply-chain-security-programs-and-issues (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
131 See Securing the Global Supply Chain:
Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan, supra note 129, at 19-20.
132 ContainerSecurity Initiative (CSI), supra note 113.
133 id
134 ld
135 KEY CARGO SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED, supra note 127.
136 Id.
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approval at the border without checking to make sure that promised
security measures actually are in place at their facilities."' 37
iii.

The 100% Scanning Initiative

The SAFE Port Act, which the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Act of 2007 amended, 138 also mandated 100% screening of
all high-risk containers coming to U.S. ports from foreign countries by
July 1, 2012.139 The SAFE Port Act did allow the DHS to extend the
deadline for two years under certain circumstances.1 40 The DHS
extended the deadline further to 2014.141 The topic has fostered
considerable debate, with the requirement drawing much criticism and

praise.142
The majority of the objections to the scanning requirement are
logistical and economic in nature.143 Not surprisingly, companies
137Container Security

Initiative (CSI), supra note 113; see also Bralliar,supra note
78, at 61-62 (discussing the inadequate "enforcement [and] oversight" of the C-TPAT
Initiative).
138Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701, 121 Stat. 266, 489 (2007) (amending 6
U.S.C. §
982(b) (2006)).
139 6 U.S.C. § 982(a), (b)(2) (2012).
140 § 982(b)(4).
141 See Bondareff & O'Neill, supra note 32.
142 See, e.g., James J. Carafano & Jessica Zuckerman, Maritime Cargo Scanning
Folly: Bad for the Economy, Wrong for Security, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 2,

2012), http://report.heritage.org/wm348 1.
143 See id. (arguing cost and infrastructure mandate against the 100% scanning
requirement); Susan E. Martonosi, David S. Ortiz & Henry H. Willis, Evaluating the
Viability of 100 Percent ContainerInspection at America's Ports, in THE ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 218, 237-38 (Harry W. Richardson, Peter Gordon &

James E. Moore II eds., 2005) (arguing for the use of a quantitative analysis to
evaluate security initiatives and that, unless attack damages or the likelihood of an
attack are quite high, 100% scanning is not cost-effective and noting that the adoption
of the requirement could be infeasible due to labor costs and lack of adequate
technologies), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1220.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2013); FREDERIC CARLUER, GLOBAL LOGISTICS CHAIN SECURITY:
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE US 100% CONTAINER SCANNING LAW, (University of Le

Havre study commissioned by the World Customs Organization, June 2008) available
at http://www.tradeinnovations.com/Documents/News/WCO%2OScanning%20Study.
pdf (analyzing the economic and logistical effects of the 100% scanning policy).
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working on developing new cargo scanning technology are "lobbying
on the Hill, trying to prevent Congress from overturning existing
legislation to expand cargo container scanning requirements." 44
Scholars have made the point that the 100% requirement "is not only
wasteful, but it violates an age-old axiom in the security
field that if
45
nothing.""
see
will
you
everything,
at
look
to
'you have
The DHS and the CBP established the Secure Freight Initiative
(the "SFI") "to test the feasibility of scanning [100%] of U.S.-bound
cargo containers." 46
Unfortunately, the SFI is apparently an
unmitigated failure.14 7 None of the ports selected to participate in the
SFI program, which include "Hong Kong, Oman, Pakistan, South
Korea, and the UK, . . . were able to meet the 100% scanning

requirement and still keep [] cargo moving in an expeditious
manner." 48 In light of these results, the DHS has extended the July
2012 deadline to 2014.149 In making this determination, then DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano "noted that the extension was necessary
because implementing the requirement at [that] time would 'have [had]
a significant and negative impact on trade capacity and the flow of
cargo."' 150 She further observed that "foreign ports lack[ed] the
physical space and configuration for efficiently routing cargo through
inspection stations."15 1 At this point in time, the feasibility of 100%
scanning remains basically unproven.

Marjorie Censer, Sloane, Former SRA Chief Unveils First Decision SciencesEquipped Port, WASH. POsT (Aug. 26, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2012-08-26/business/35491655_1_cosmic-rays-gao-scan.
145 Flynn & Kirkpatrick, supra note 41.
144

146 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-940T, MARITIME
SECURITY: DHS
PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN KEY AREAS OF PORT SECURITY (2010), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0940t.pdf.
147 See Carafano & Zuckerman, supra note
142.
148 Bondareff & O'Neill, supra note
32.
149
Iso
1

Id.
Id.
Id.
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b.

The MTSA's TWIC Program

"Biometrics are yesterday's solutionfor today's problem."
-

George Jonas1 5 2

The TSA and U.S. Coast Guard jointly administer the TWIC
TWICs are "tamper-resistant biometric
reader program.153
credential[s]" (fingerprint template) that are issued to "workers who
require unescorted access to secure areas" of an MTSA-regulated port
or vessel. 154 MTSA regulations require TWIC cards for all U.S. Coast
Guard credentialed merchant mariners, port-facility employees,
longshore workers, truck drivers, and others requiring unescorted access

152

Bralliar, supra note 78, at 54 (quoting George Jonas, Biometrics Won't Catch

Disposable Terrorists, NAT'L POST, Jan. 19, 2004, http://www.georgejonas.ca/recent
writing.aspx?id= 165).

46 U.S.C. § 70105 (2006). Established as part of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002, the relevant section requires
the Secretary (at the time the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation) to issue biometric transportation security cards to
prevent unauthorized individuals from entering an area of a vessel
Currently, TSA is
or facility designated as a secure area.
'

responsible for enrollment . . . and systems operations and

maintenance related to TWICs while the USCG is responsible for
establishing and enforcing access control standards including
requirements for TWIC readers at MTSA-regulated facilities and
vessels.
Written Testimony of TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis Assistant Administrator
Stephen Sadler for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security Hearing Titled "Threat, Risk and Vulnerability: The
Future of the TWIC Program", DEP'T OF HOMELAND

SEC. (June 18, 2013),

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/06/18/written-testimony-tsa-house-homeland-securitysubcommittee-border-and-maritime.
154 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY Office, GAO-13-198, TRANSPORTATION WORKER
IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL: CARD READER PILOT RESULTS ARE UNRELIABLE;
SECURITY BENEFITS NEED TO BE REASSESSED 1 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL],

see Using TWIC With
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654431.pdf;
Biometics Will Be a Challenge, SECURITYINFOWATCH.COM (Jan. 25, 2008),

http://www.securityinfowatch.com/press-release/10561888/using-twic-withbiometrics-will-be-challenge (discussing how biometric technology is used in the
workforce).

FloridaCoastalLaw Review

96

[Vol. 15:71

to secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels. 5 5 There are currently
2,685,280 workers enrolled.156
Sadly, TWIC is another effort at increasing port security that
appears to have failed.157 In May 2013, the GAO issued a highly
critical report concerning the TWIC reader pilot program, finding that
the results of the program were "incomplete, inaccurate and
unreliable." 5 8 Between 2008 and 2011, the pilot program tested a
number of various readers at ports and aboard vessels.159 In light of the
results, the GAO did not recommend that Congress use the findings
from the pilot program to develop a reader regulation.160 Rather,
Congress should require the DHS to reassess whether readers actually
increase port security and perform "a comprehensive comparison of
alternative credentialing approaches, which might include a more
decentralized approach, for achieving TWIC program goals."l61
In light of the report's conclusions, the pilot program's data does
not confirm any prior claims from the DHS to Congress that readers
would actually enhance security at ports.162 Rather, the report found
that "11 years after initiation . . . the security benefits of the [TWIC]

program have yet to be demonstrated."1 63 The GAO report also
contradicts previous conclusions by the TSA that the performance of
readers at selected ports and maritime locales across the United States
were generally positive and that readers operated effectively and

' The Safe Port Act: A Six-Month Review, HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Border,
Mar. & Global Counterterrorismof the Comm. on Homeland Sec. H.R., 11Oth Cong.
10 (2007).

"5 TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., TWIC DASHBOARD REPORT (Sept. 2013), available at

http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/twic/monthly_dashboardcurre
nt.pdf.
See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL, supra note 154, at 33.
..
8 Id. at 42-43.
15

159 Id. at
160

3-4.
Id. at 43.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 43-44.

163

Id. at 42.
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efficiently in verifying the identity of TWIC cardholders.164 In response
to the report, Representative Bennie G. Thompson, a Democrat from
Mississippi and ranking member of the House Homeland Security
Committee, said,
I am greatly concerned that despite [the] DHS investing
$544 million and 11 years in the TWIC program, the
program continues to suffer from fundamental problems
that undermine its ability to provide the security benefits
Congress intended.
Meanwhile, port workers and
industry stakeholders have invested their time, effort,
and money into this troubled program, holding up their
end of the bargain. Indeed, [the] DHS has failed to
implement [the] GAO's prior recommendations that
would have strengthened the TWIC program and
ultimately enhanced maritime security. After years of
oversight of the TWIC program, I concur with [the]
GAO's recommendation that an effectiveness assessment
of the security benefits of TWICs and the use of
biometric readers must occur before the American
people are expected to invest additional money in this
program. We cannot continue to throw good money
after bad with this program.165
Id. at 39.
Press Release, Committee on Homeland Security Democrats, Report: TWIC
Reader Pilot Results Unreliable (May 8, 2013), http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/press/
index.asp?ID=804. The TWIC program is not the only wasted investment by the
government in its attempts to harden container security. In July of 2011, the DHS
"terminated the program to develop the next generation of radiation detection monitors
....
The [A]gency spent roughly $230 million over five years attempting to develop
and field the monitor system." Martin Matishak, Homeland Security Cancels
Troubled Radiation Detector Effort, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (July 26, 2011),
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/homeland-security-cancels-troubled-radiation-detectoreffort/.
Operation Safe Commerce ("OSC") is another program that demonstrated the
spendthrift nature of certain government agencies. Initiated in 2002, OSC is "a
federally funded program that will conduct vulnerability assessments of sample supply
chains and serve as a test-bed for new business processes and security technologies to
increase the security of container shipments." Operation Safe Commerce, FIRST PORT
OF N.Y. & N.J., http://www.firstnynj.com/pdf/operation-safe-commerce.pdf (last
164

1
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visited Sept. 16, 2013).

After funding a number of "port and cargo security pilot

projects .

.

. over . . . three years," the DHS was reticent to share the results of the

projects. See Christian Beckner, AP Unmasks Operation Safe Commerce Findings,
HOMELAND SEC. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.hlswatch.com/category/ port-

and-maritime-security/page/6/. According to the article,
The [Associated Press] got hold of a series of previouslyunpublished Operation Safe Commerce documents, which serve as
the basis for the story. Some findings from the documents:
-Safety problems were not limited to overseas ports. A
warehouse in Maine was graded less secure than any in Pakistan,
Turkey or Brazil. "There is a perception that U.S. facilities benefit
from superior security protection measures," the study said. "This
mind set may contribute to a misplaced sense of confidence in
American business practices."
-No records were kept of "cursory" inspections in Guatemala
for containers filled with Starbucks Corp. coffee beans shipped to
the West Coast. "Coffee beans were accessible to anyone entering
the facility," the study said. It found significant mistakes on
manifests and other paperwork. In a statement to the AP, Starbucks
said it was reviewing its security procedures.
-Truck drivers in Brazil were permitted to take cargo containers
home overnight and park along public streets. Trains in the U.S.
stopped in rail yards that did not have fences and were in high-crime
areas. A shipping industry adage reflects unease over such
practices: "A container at rest is a container at risk." . . .
-Containers could be opened aboard some ships during
weekslong voyages to America. "Due to the time involved in transit
(and) the fact that most vessel crew members are foreigners with
limited credentialing and vetting, the containers are vulnerable to
intrusion during the ocean voyage," the study said.
Id. There were three phases of Operation Safe Commerce. See Operation Safe
Commerce Phase III, FED. GRANTS, http://www.federalgrants.com/Operation-SafeCommerce-Phase-III-2777.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). Each phase had a large
price tag. See id. For example, the grant funds available for just Phase Ill of container
security projects totaled $17.1 million. See id. For the three-year period between
2002 and 2005, the DHS "spent $75 million to track several companies' cargo
containers coming into the seaports of Seattle/Tacoma, Los Angeles/Long Beach, and
New York/New Jersey." Ben Worthen, Security Compliance-Customs Rattles the
Supply Chain, CIO MAG., Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.cio.com/article/17906/Security
Compliance_Customs Rattles theSupplyChain. The project "used GPS technology
and radio frequency identification to monitor cargo from a handful of importers
(including Sara Lee and Motorola) as it made its way from overseas factories to its
final destination in the United States." Id. The purported goal of OSC "was to
identify weak links in the global supply chain. A report summarizing its findings was
due more than a year ago, in February 2005. To date . .. no report has been released.
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THE RISE OF CONTAINERIZATION

Malcolm McLean, Father of Containerization and Global Trade

In the early 1950s, cargo ships carried a great variety of goods
ranging from sugar, bananas, and coffee to bars of copper and coils of
steel wire. 166 "Most cargoes came in sacks, boxes, cartons, bales, or
barrels. . ... "167 Known as "breakbulk,"1 68 each item of these mixed
cargoes had to be loaded individually or hoisted onto the vessel using a
sling board and crane.' 69 Like a scene out of On the Waterfront,170
gangs of longshoremen "clambered up gangplanks with loads on their
backs or toiled deep in the holds of ships, stowing boxes and barrels in
every available corner." 17 ' The unloading process could be equally
grueling and time consuming.1 72
Then along came Malcolm Purcell McLean. 17 3 In 1937,
McLean found himself sitting in his truck waiting to unload bales of
cotton he had brought from Fayetteville, North Carolina, to a vessel
docked in Hoboken, New Jersey. 174 While watching the stevedores load
other cargo, McLean "came across the idea that not only changed his

But sources close to the project have told CIO that Operation Safe Commerce revealed
that companies actually know very little about what goes on in their supply chains."
Id.
166 LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 17-18.
167 STAN WEIR, SINGLEJACK SOLIDARITY 92 (George Lipsitz ed., Univ. of Minn. Press

2004), availableat http://libcom.org/files/Weir%20-%20Singlejack%20Solidarity.pdf.
The term "bulk" cargo is generally used to describe "commodities such as coal or
grain, which can be loaded on a ship in a continuous process without packaging or
sorting." LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 19 n.*. In contrast, "breakbulk" cargo "consists
of discrete items that must be handled individually." Id.
169Id. at 17.

170 Winner of eight Academy Awards, including best picture, best director, and best
actor, On the Waterfront was directed by Elia Kazan and starred Marlon Brando as
Terry Malloy.
Filmsite Movie Review:
On the Waterfront, FILMSITE.ORG,
http://www.filmsite.org/onth.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
171LEVINSON, supranote 6, at 16.
172 Id. at 17-18.
173

Anthony J. Mayo & Nitin Nohria, The Truck Driver Who Reinvented
Shipping,

WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 3, 2005), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/cgi-bin/print/5026.html.
I74 Id.
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He recalled, "I had to wait most of the day to deliver the
bales, sitting there in my truck, watching stevedores load
other cargo. It struck me that I was looking at a lot of
wasted time and money. I watched them take each crate
off the truck and slip it into a sling, which would then lift
the crate into the hold of the ship." 76
Then "[t]he thought occurred to me, as I waited around that day,
that it would be easier to lift my trailer up and, without any of its
contents being touched, put it on the ship." 7 7
McLean did not immediately pursue his idea.' 7 8 Instead, he first
"set out to become rich. By 1940 he had 30 lorries. In 1955, when he
had decided that containerization was the future, he sold his trucking
business for $6 [million], equivalent to $40 [million] today." 79 He
invented and patented the first shipping container in 1956.180
Ultimately, he later founded Sea-Land Service, Inc.
Malcolm McLean-The Man Who Changed the World, CONTAINER TRANSP.,
http://www.container-transportation.com/malcolm-mclean.html (last visited Sept. 18,
2013).
1

176 Id.
177

Malcolm McLean: Malcolm PurcellMcLean, Pioneerof ContainerShips, Died on

May 25th, Aged 87, THE ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/63856 1/print.
178

Id

1

Id.

(May

31,

2001),

available at

McLean-The Inventor of ISO Shipping Containers, INT'L MARINE
(Jan. 19, 2009), http://www.imcbrokers.com/blog/overview/detail/
malcolm-mclean-the-inventor-of-iso-shipping-containers.
18 Id.
Sea-Land Service, Inc. ("Sea-Land") was a pioneering shipping and
containerization company founded by American entrepreneur Malcolm McLean in
1960, out of the operations of the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company, which McLean
acquired in 1955. Malcolm McLean-The Man Changed the World, CONTAINER
TRANSP., http://www.container-transportation.com/malcolm-mclean.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013). Sea-Land existed under various changes of ownership, passing from
R. J. Reynolds to CSX Corporation ("CSX"), until CSX split it into two liner
companies and a terminal operator. History, HORIZON LINES, http://horizonlines.com/
About-Horizon/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). The international liner
180Malcolm
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As a result of McLean's epiphany, by 1975, in excess of "twothirds of all dry cargoes moving across the docks of major American
ports" were shipped in containers.' 82 "Ships of traditional design[]whose double bottoms and sweat battens once felt the burdens of
sacked coffee, spices, sugar, and various cartoned goods and absorbed
their smells-became unusual sights at long-used piers."' 83 Instead,
ports now boast "new or remodeled ships whose holds are slotted
exactly to receive and nest . .. rectangular, locked, sealed, clean, and
odorless containers." 84
B.

The Mechanics of Transport by Container

One can think of containerships as floating malls in terms of
possible cargo types and amounts. Just as stores in a mall vary in size,
In 1961, the International Organization for
so do cargo containers.'
Standardization set standard sizes for all cargo containers as twenty-foot
containers, referred to as a twenty-foot equivalent unit ("TEU").186
Currently, the most frequently used container is the forty-foot container,
which would be two TEUs.18 7 Standardization was necessary to allow
intermodal transportation.' 8 8 On board the vessel, containers are
efficiently stacked one upon another.189 At the port, containers must be
company and the Sea-Land name was acquired by, and formally incorporated into, the
operations of the A. P. Moller-Maersk Group in December 1999. Id. The domestic
liner company was sold by CSX in 2003. Id. In 2005 it went public and now operates
as Horizon Lines, Inc., using a modified Sea-Land logo. Id.
182 WEIR, supra note 167, at 91.
183 Id.

I84 Id.
185See Containers, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, http://www.worldshipping.org/about-

the-industry/containers (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
186 Id.

187Id.

In addition to standard dry cargo containers, there are special equipment
containers with unique designs, including "open end, open side, open top, half-height,
flat rack, refrigerated (known as 'reefer'), liquid bulk (tank), and modular [which are]
all built to [the] same exterior lengths and widths as the standard dry cargo
Id.; see also Holly Schubert, Container Shipping, ABOUT.COM,
containers."
http://freight.about.com/od/Containers/a/Container-Shipping.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2013).
188 See Containers,supra note 185.
189

Id
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unloaded by cranes and capable of transfer to truck or train to reach
their final destination.190 Standardization has created rail and truck
companies for containers that are "interchangeable between shipping
companies."l91 This interchangeability results in more efficient loading
and unloading, which ultimately lowers the price of goods and allows
consumers to purchase goods from around the world.192
It is important to recognize that a threat to U.S. ports is also a
threat to the interior of the country.' 93 Maritime container security is
not just about transporting boxes on ocean-going vessels.' 94 It is the
embodiment of intermodal transportation at its highest level.19 5 The
container is part of an international chain of supply.196 In the usual
cargo container transportation process, an importer must rely on a
number of "second-hand parties to move cargo in containers and
prepare various transportation documents."' 97 In a normal container
shipment process, these parties may include exporters, freight
forwarders, customs brokers, customs inspectors, port operators, and
ocean carriers, which may include feeder vessels.198 The chain of

190

See Schubert, supra note 187.

191 Id

Id. Modem containers carry a variety of goods. See id.
Stephen S. Cohen, Boom Boxes: Containers and Terrorists, in PROTECTING
THE NATION'S SEAPORTS: BALANCING SECURITY AND COST 91, 99 (Jon D. Haveman
& Howard J. Shatz eds., 2006), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/
r_606jhr.pdf.
194 Id. at 104.
195 id
196 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-557, CONTAINER SECURITY:
A FLEXIBLE STAFFING MODEL AND MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WOULD
IMPROVE OVERSEAS TARGETING AND INSPECTION EFFORTS 1, 5-6 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/246125.pdf.
197 Id. ("Relatively few importers own and operate all key aspects of the cargo
container transportation process, which includes overseas manufacturing and
warehouse facilities, carrier ships to transport goods, and the transportation operation
to receive the goods upon arrival.").
198 Id.; Bralliar,supra note 78, at 12-13 (quoting JOHN F. FRITTELLI, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL31733, PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 8 (2005)). Feeder vessels or ships are "watercrafts employed in short sea
routes to fetch or carry goods and containers to and from ocean going vessels."
Feeder Vessel Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/
192

193 See
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supply also includes entities that usually perform the final leg of the
shipment-inland transportation providers, such as trucks or
railroads.199 It is the inland cogs of the system that have the potential to
extend the threat of terrorist attacks at ports to America's heartland.20 0
Each time control over the container changes hands, there is a securitybreach risk.20 1
While all containers may pose a risk for the transportation of
terrorist devices, the most problematical are those stuffed with what are
known as "mixed loads." 202 These loads consist of differing items and
materials that are added to the container at varying places.2 03 According
to one estimate, almost forty percent of the containers arriving in U.S.
seaports contain mixed loads. 204 Such containers increase the likelihood
that "[t]he documentation . . . provided to the ocean carrier by the

shipping company" is inaccurate.205 This is the information that the
ocean carrier ultimately forwards to U.S. customs. 206 A key example of
the fact that shipping companies successfully report inaccurate
information is the huge amount of counterfeit goods that enter the
United States each year.2 0 7 Clearly, shipping companies do not report
the true contents of the containers that contain such goods. 20 8 Business
f/feeder-vessel/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). They are part of "a cargo network in
which the larger, faster vessels only call at the major ports at both ends of the area
being covered, and the smaller ports are served by the smaller feeder vessels which
transfer the cargo to and from the major port terminals and thus keep the larger vessels
filled closer to capacity." Id. This portion of the multi-modal network saves the larger
container vessel "the expense and loss of time in loading and unloading in the
subsidiary ports." Id. Ultimately, "the smaller vessels feed the big liners, which carry
thousands of containers." Id.
199 See sources cited supra note 198.
See Cohen, supra note 193, at 99.

200

201 CONTAINER SECURITY: A FLEXIBLE STAFFING MODEL AND MINIMUM EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS WOULD IMPROVE OVERSEAS TARGETING AND INSPECTION EFFORTS,

supra note 196, at 6.
202 See Cohen, supra note 193, at
103.
203
204
205

id.
id.
Id. at 104.

206 Id.
207 See
208

id.
See id.
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Week estimates that counterfeit goods may compose five to seven
percent of imported, international goods.2 09
IV.

UNEXPECTED CARGO: THE "TERRORIST" STOWAWAY

"A box that is not moving is a box at risk, and the average
containermakes 17 shifts."
-

Stephen S. Cohen 2 10

Containers are utilized to ship over ninety percent of the world's
nonbulk cargo. 2 1 1 Consequently, each day "thousands of cargo
containers from around the world pass through our nation's sea ports
carrying items we need, and possibly some that are not so welcome:
drugs, explosives, chemical [weapons], biological ... weapons-even
human cargo."2 12
Two frequently discussed scenarios of container usage by
terrorists that pose the greatest threat to port security are (1) the loaded
container with the terrorist weapon of choice to target specific portS213
and (2) the port as a conduit for stockpiling weapons within the borders
214
What some may label as "the terrorist in the
of the United States.
box" is another equally viable threat to the integrity of the port

209

Id.;

Fakes!,

BLOOMBERG

BUSINESSWEEK

MAG.
(Feb.
6,
2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/ 191504-fakes?type=old_article.
210 Cohen, supra note 193, at 103-04; see also FLYNN, supra note 4, at
89 ("On
average, overseas containers will pass through seventeen intermediate points before
they arrive at their final U.S. destination.").
211 Martin Murray, Containerization, ABOUT.COM, http://logistics.about.com/od/
tacticalsupplychain/a/Containerization.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
212 Ship Cargo Containers-FindingOut What's in Them Before There's Trouble,
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/ship-cargo-containers-%E2%80%93finding-out-what%E2%80%99s-them-there%E2%80%99s-trouble (last visited Sept.
17, 2013). See generally U.S. Public Port Facts, AM. ASSOC. OF PORT AUTHS.,
http://www.aapa-ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ltemNumber-1032 (last visited Sept.
17, 2013) (providing additional information about U.S. public ports).
213 See Cohen, supra note 193, at 92, 94-99 (describing the ease with which a terrorist
could load deadly weapons in a container and send it to a U.S. port).
214 HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 1-2.
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system.
Prior to being loaded aboard a ship, empty containers are
frequently stored in a warehouse or the quayside for an extended
period.2 1 6 This creates a perfect opportunity for the inventive stowaway
"to install a false wall at the rear end of the container, stretching from
side to side and from top to bottom." 217 Once the stowaway constructs
the false wall, he or she will paint it to match the color of the
container's rear wall.2 18
A.
1.

The Profile of the Modern-Day Stowaway

The Influence of Popular Culture

The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic, as amended, defines stowaway as
[a] person who is secreted on a ship, or in cargo which is
subsequently loaded on the ship, without the consent of
the shipowner or the master or any other responsible
person and who is detected on board the ship after it has
departed from a port, or in the cargo while unloading it
in the port of arrival, and is reported as a stowaway by
the master to the appropriate authorities.2 19
See Don Walsh, A Difficult Journey Ahead for the Cruise Ship Industry, NAVY
LEAGUE OF THE U.S. (Dec. 2002), http://www.navyleague.org/seapower/dec_02_
51.php (discussing one "terrorist in a box" incident involving a suspected al-Qaeda
member hiding in a container destined for Toronto).
215

216 Stowaways, SECURE A SHIP, http://www.secureaship.com/services-maritimesecurity/port-security/stowaways (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
217 Id.
218 id

International Maritime Organization, Convention on Facilitation of International
Maritime Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, 18 U.S.T. 411, 591 U.N.T.S. 265 (as amended Aug. 1,
2006); see, e.g., Plaintiffs' Response to Tropical Shipping's & Harren & Partner
Schiffahrts GmbH's Motions to Dismiss, Cabrera v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co.,
No. 00-9088-Civ-Seitz (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2001) (discussing the liability of a
shipowner for the deaths of three stowaways on his vessel); see also Came Aboard
Ship on Wave, They Said, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1914), http://query.ny
times.com/mem/archive-free/pdf7res=Fl0611 F83C5412738DDDADOA94DA405B8D
FlD3 (discussing one of the first reported instances of stowaways); Harold Hamill,
The Ocean Ferry Reporter Tells of Stowaways He Has Seen, GJENVICK,
219

106
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Historically, stowaways have often been individuals who were
fleeing political or economic upheavals or oppression occurring in their
native country and seeking asylum in the United States.22 0 In contrast
to reality, popular culture has often romanticized the plight of the
stowaway or employed the subject matter as the basis for a tale of
heroism.221 Examples include the light-hearted 1936 Shirley Temple

http://www.gjenvick.com/SteamshipArticles/Stowaways/1928- 11 -StowawaysOn
Steamships.html#axzz2dZAqsXpz (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (reporting several
instances of stowaways).
220 See, e.g., Mary Brooks, Stowaway's CriminalPast Turns Up in Investigation, THE
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 10, 1991, at B4, available at 1991 WLNR 4127821 (A

Haitian stowaway was being "held in chains aboard a cargo ship docked in Tampa
[due to] a history of criminal arrests and illegal attempts to enter the United States."
The stowaway was originally granted asylum in 1973 but returned to Haiti in the late
1980s due to criminal activity); Leonard S. Glickman, Seeking Freedom: A Child
Finds Himself Behind Bars, REFUGE, May 1, 2002, at 65, available at 2002 WLNR
14778776 (examining the case of a seventeen-year-old boy seeking asylum who
stowed away aboard an Italian container ship and then was "indefinitely detained by
the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service in an adult facility, on the
basis of radial and dental exams."); Kari Huus, Illegal Chinese Immigrants Land in
U.S. Limbo, MSNBC (Apr. 18, 2006, 6:22 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
12174500/ns/usnews-life/t/illegal-chinese-immigrants-land-us-limbo/ (reporting on
twenty-two Chinese stowaways who traveled from Shanghai to the port of Seattle in a
forty-foot-long container); Miami Cubans Protest Deporting of Stowaway, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 18, 1982), http://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0118/011820.html
(reporting on demonstrations in Miami in response to a Cuban stowaway who was
denied asylum and deported back to Cuba); Stowaways Seeking Asylum Held in
Shackles, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1994, available at 1994 WLNR 4367289 (reporting on
twenty-five Romanian stowaways, including twenty found in containers aboard a ship
in Boston, who were held in leg shackles while their request for political asylum was
pending); Joseph F. Sullivan, In Shift, Immigration Service Won't Hold Stowaways,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 05, 1994, at B5, available at 1994 WLNR 3850317 (reporting that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as opposed to the owner of the plane or
ship, will take custody of stowaways and parole them while their requests for asylum
are being reviewed); Luisa Yanez, 2 Fleeing Cubans Arrive in Style, As Stowaways on
Luxury Liner, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1993, at 2B, available at 1993 WLNR
4296721 (reporting on two Cuban refugees seeking asylum in the United States who
managed to stow away on a cruise ship while it was docked in Cayman Islands).
221 W.M. von Zharen, Human Contraband: Stowaways in Popular Culture, 31 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 601, 601 (2000).
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film, Stowaway;222 the 1931 hit, Monkey Business, which features the
zany antics of the Marx Brothers; 22 3 The Quest, a 1996 martial-arts film
starring Jean-Claude Van Damme as a stowaway aboard a tramp
steamer;224 and the classic, Torn Curtain, an Alfred Hitchcock suspense
thriller starring Paul Newman and Julie Andrews who ultimately escape
from East Berlin by stowing away on an East German vessel to reach a
port in the free world.2 25
In light of more recent media reports of actual stowaways "being
pulled from cargo containers emaciated and traumatized, or even dead,"
popular culture's skewed portrayal of the stowaway has been revised.2 26
A prime example would be HBO's 1996 film, Deadly Voyage, based
upon the true story of eight African stowaways, only one of whom
survived after discovery by the crew,227 or the 1997 French film,
Clandestins,a gut-wrenching tale of six ill-fated refugees. 228
Popular culture's altered perception of the stowaway not only
includes the victimized stowaway229 but also the modern reality of the
2222

222 STOWAWAY (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1936).

In the film, the famous
child star, Temple, portrays an appealing and winsome orphan named Ching-Chong
who accidentally stows away after falling asleep with her little dog, Mr. Woo, in the
trunk of a car being shipped on a steamer bound for San Francisco. Id.
223 MONKEY BUSINESS (Paramount Pictures 1931) (starring the Marx Brothers who
stow away on a vessel making its transatlantic crossing, and, up to their signature
antics, they manage to insult and annoy just about everyone on board).
224 THE QUEST (MDP Worldwide 1996).
225 TORN CURTAIN (Universal Pictures 1966).
226 Zharen supra note 221, at 601.
227 DEADLY VOYAGE (HBO 1996). Taking place over twelve days, the film recounts
how the crew discovered the stowaways after they were forced to come out of hiding
due to loss of their water supply. Id. Ultimately, the crew caught seven of them,
summarily executed each of them by a shot to the head, and threw them overboard.
Id.
228 CLANDESTINS (Dschoint Ventschr Filmproduktion AG 1997).
As the six
stowaways, which include two men, two women, and two children, attempt to reach
Canada from a French port, they are confined in a cargo container 269.10 square feet
in size. Id.
229 The tragic story told in Deadly Voyage, supra note 227, is not an isolated event.
Unfortunately, the risk explored in the films that dramatize the stowaway as a victim
often mirrors true events. See, e.g., CaptainDefends Stowaway, SUN SENTINEL, Sept.
7, 1985, at 14A, available at 1985 WLNR 1042110 (reporting on eleven African
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stowaway as a terrorist.230 A 2011 episode of NCIS,2 3 1 entitled "Safe
Harbor," 232 highlights the stowaway terrorist theme. In the broadcast,
the NCIS team investigates the murder of a coast guard officer aboard
an abandoned cargo vessel.23 3 The team discovers a Lebanese family of
four locked behind service panels on the ship who all profess to be
seeking asylum in the United States.23 4 As the plot develops, the NCIS
team discovers that the father, under an alias, is a former anti-U.S.
bomber who is wanted in connection with a 1984 bombing in
Lebanon.23 5 One of the two sons planned to carry out his father's dream
by bombing the Norfolk port in a suicide-bombing mission.2 36
Charlie Sheldon, a former executive director of the Port of
Seattle, wrote the 2003 novel, The Boomerang Heist, which presents
another disquieting illustration of the terrorist stowaway.23 7
Sheldon's novel describes a so-called Boomerang Box, a
container that has been decorated by Seattle high school students as part

stowaways who were thrown overboard); Robert D. McFadden, 3 Stowaways on
FreighterSaved at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at BI, available at 1994 WLNR
3524563 (reporting the rescue of six stowaways from the Dominican Republic who,
after being discovered aboard an Estonian freighter, were beaten and subjected to
forced labor); see generally Elissa Steglich, Hiding in the Hulls: Attacking the
Practice of High Seas Murder of Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal
Jurisdiction, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1323 (2000) (explaining that the vastness of the sea itself
gives rise to the mistreatment and killing of stowaways).
230 See Marjorie Florestal, Terror on the High Seas, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 386
(2006) (explaining that terrorists hiding themselves in shipping containers has become
an important issue in the War on Terror).
231 See NCIS, CBS, http://www.cbs.com/shows/ncis/about/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2013) (explaining that "NCIS" is the acronym for the Naval Criminal Investigation
Service).
232 NCIS: Safe Harbor(CBS television broadcast
Oct. 8, 2011).
233
234

235

Id.
Id.
Id.

236

id
In addition to serving as executive director for the Port of Seattle, Mr. Sheldon also
spent twenty years in the commercial fishing industry on the East Coast and worked
237

for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
BOOMERANG HEIST (2003).

CHARLIE SHELDON, THE
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of a school project.2 3 8 The students tracked the container aboard the
vessel, Kiyo Maru, as it made its way along its trade route from Seattle
to Japan. 239 Upon the return of the promotional container to the Port of
Seattle, world leaders attending an economic conference, including the
President of the United States and seventeen other heads of state, are to
240
meet the vessel.
In the prologue quoted below, readers discover the protagonist
of the novel, an investigative reporter, aboard a container ship traveling
from Kobe, Japan, to the Port of Seattle. 24 1 When the ship is barely out
to sea, "terrorist" stowaways, who have been hiding in the Boomerang
Box container, highjack Kiyo Maru.242
September 20, the nearfuture
Royal stared through the lens, imagining all the
hours, and days, he'd be stuck on this ship, filming ...
what? Distant views from his cabin here five stories
above the deck? All the containers stacked fore and aft?
The crew as they went about their totally boring duties?
What?
That is, if Captain Harris allowed him to leave his
cabin. This was shocking. House arrest at sea and the
pilot not off the ship an hour? They had sixteen days to
go. Nobody could do this to Royal Breem, investigative
reporter par excellence, could they? Well, former par
excellence. He drank more gin.
Suddenly light flashed from the dark container on
top of the stack directly opposite his aft window.
Something shifted and the sealed end of the container
opened, levering back like a garage door except over the
top instead of inside. Red light glowed. He saw men
dressed in dark coveralls and masks pushing one

238 Id. at 8-9.

239 Id. at 8-9, 49; see also von Zharen, supra note 221, at 604.
240 SHELDON, supra note 237, at 12-15.
241 Id. at 1-2.
242 See
id.
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extension ladder, then another, from within the container
across the void between the end of the container and the
deckhouse. Royal understood the ladders were being
placed on the landing of the outside emergency stairway
one deck below his, bridging the ten-foot gap between
the end of the container and the stair landing.
The moment both ladders were in place, men
began crossing, one after another. He counted nine, ten,
eleven, twelve. The last man lowered the container door.
Now the container looked just as it had before,
dark, silent, but for the two ladders extending to the
stairs. For the moments it had been open Royal had
seen, beyond the dark form emerging, carpet, bunks,
supplies.
The ship had departed Kobe, what, five hours
earlier? The pilot let off two hours later?
What was going on?
It was obvious what was going on. A Trojan
Horse had been delivered to the ship.
He had to warn the captain.243
Outbound, the Boomerang Box was simply a container loaded
with innocuous "[c]ardboard flats for use as milk cartons in Japan." 244
According to the designer of the school project, after docking and
unloading in Japan, the container would "be loaded with something else
and shipped on." 245 It is this "something else" that makes The
Boomerang Heist a chilling commentary on the possible use of
246
stowaways by terrorists.
This alternate scenario, where stowaways are essentially human
WMDs, occurs when stowaways do not emerge from a container until
after the vessel has docked at a U.S. port.24 7 The unexpected, human

243

id,

244

Id. at 9.

245

Id.

246

See id. at 1-2.

247

See id.
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cargo becomes a weapon with the potential to fulfill Osama bin Laden's
dream of destroying the American economy. 248
2.

True Tales of Stowaways in the Twenty-First Century

In light of the current vulnerability of U.S. ports to unwittingly
serve as gateways for terrorist attacks, we can no longer assume that a
stowaway is simply a "would-be illegal entrant" seeking a better life. 249
Rather, the potential for a Boomerang Heist scenario is not simply
fiction.2 5 0 There are a number of incidents that have occurred since
9/11 that illustrate the porosity in the current approach to cargo
1 251
security.
Approximately one month after the attacks of 9/11, an event
arguably confirmed the fear that some might use containers to transport
terrorists to the United States. 2 52 In October of 2001, port authorities

See id.; Joel Arak, Bin Laden's Target: U.S. Wallet, CBS (Oct. 29, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bin-ladens-target-us-wallet/.
248

Rosalie Balkin, The InternationalMaritime Organization and Maritime Security,
30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 13 (2006).
250 See Phillipe Crist, Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic
Impact, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.: MAR. TRANSP. COMM. 8-9 (2003),
249

http://www.oecd.org/sti/transport/maritimetransport/18521672.pdf (detailing how a
potential terrorist was inadvertently found in a shipping container in 2001).
251 Secure A Ship, a Panamanian company specializing in maritime security, authored
a 2011 report that reveals that the cargo security system is also compromised when
stowaways receive "extensive shore backup and assistance from individuals who are
part of various organisations related to port operations when boarding vessels."
Stowaways, supra note 216. The stowaway "will have inside knowledge of the ship's
destination, departure date, at which pier it is going to berth etc." Id. This problem is
of particular concern in North Africa where
stowaways bribe their way into port facilities and other restricted
areas. Once inside the port area they look for an opportunity to
board the ship.... Recent stowaway interviews have revealed that
crew on board have also been involved in the safe passage of
stowaways. On some ships stowaways have had to pay a ticket to
one of the crew on board as well, i.e. bribing both port officials and
crew on board.
Id.
252

Crist, supra note 250, at 8.
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discovered a stowaway in Gioia Tauro, a port in southern Italy.2 53 The
shipping container was "well-appointed . . . complete with bed, heater,

toilet facilities and water." 254 The stowaway had with him "a cell
phone, a satellite phone, a lap-top computer and, ominously, given
recent events, airport security passes and an airline mechanic's
certificate valid for New York's JFK, Newark, L.A. International and
O'Hare airports."255 An Egyptian office had chartered the container slot
and it was loaded in Port Said.2 5 6 In Italy, the container was to have
been transshipped and carried to Rotterdam and then transshipped one
final time to Canada, its final destination.25 7 If the stowaway had not
attempted to "widen the container's ventilation holes when port workers
were nearby, the container would have likely passed through
unhindered to its final destination." 258 Except for its unexpected cargo,
the container was "nearly indistinguishable from any of the other 2.5
million handled at Gioia Tauro in 2001 .,,259 This incident illustrates the
apparent ease with which a person can subvert the container transport
system. 260
In the summer of 2002, "a news crew successfully smuggled 15
pounds of uranium into New York Harbor." 2 6 1 Then "the news team
successfully repeated their uranium importation [in 2003] in Los

253
254
255
256
257

258
259

id
id
id
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
id.

id
Id at 8.
261 Brian Ross, Rhonda Schwartz & David Scott, Customs
Fails to Detect Depleted
Uranium, ABC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2002), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129
321 &page= I&singlePage=true; see Brian Kates, HarborFears High, Terror Funding
Low, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2003), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/
harbor-fears-high-terror-funding-article-1.522970; Charles. E. Schumer, Two Years
Later: Is the Federal Government Doing Enough to Protect New York? Grading the
Federal Homeland Security Efforts in New York and the Nation (2003),
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=44956 1.
260
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Angeles, shipping 15 pounds of uranium from Indonesia past Customs
officials by simply not declaring it." 26 2
In January 2005, "[t]hirty-two Chinese men were found inside
two cargo containers on a ship arriving at the Port of Los Angeles"
when a crane operator unloading the containers noticed three men
climbing out of one.263 According to the police, they seemed to be in
excellent shape, noting that the containers had "food, water, sleeping
bags, backpacks and battery-powered fans" mounted on the top. 2 64
In 2006, twenty-two Chinese Nationals apparently let
themselves out of a forty-foot cargo container at the Port of Seattle. 26 5
Having traveled "[i]nside the dark, musty, 40-foot metal box, the 18
men and four women, all in their 20s and 30s, had spent 15 days
crossing the Pacific Ocean to the U.S., with no fresh air or light." 266
According to authorities, "[t]hey had blankets and clothing, toolspresumably to help them break out of the container-and a supply of
water."267 In addition, "they had portable fans to disperse the air." 26 8
However, the "security guards who discovered them would later
describe the stench inside the container as overwhelming. Agents found
mounds of discarded food packages and containers filled with human
waste." 269
More recently, in late June 2013, federal agents took two
Columbian men into custody after a security officer discovered them in
a ship container traveling from Venezuela to Fort Lauderdale. 2 70 A

Kates, supra note 261; Schumer, supra note 261.
Chinese Men Found Inside Containers at LA Port, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 2005,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-01-16-chinese-port-x.htm.
264 Id.
265 Lornet Turnbull, Kristi Heim, Sara Jean Green & Sanjay Bhatt,
15 Days in a Metal
Box to Be Locked Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, http://seattletimes.com/htmil/
localnews/2002914004_smuggling.html.
266 id.
262
263

267
268
269

Id.
Id.
Id.

Tonya Alanez, Two Stowaways from Venezuela Found on Ship, SUN
June 23, 2013, at 6B, available at 2013 WLNR 15318889.
270

SENTINEL,
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security officer discovered the men at Port Everglades "[a]fter the
container was offloaded from the ship onto the dock [when] a ship
security officer noticed that the container door was open and he saw two
men 'hiding inside.' The security officer 'immediately closed the door
to lock the males inside' and notified authorities." 27 1
Clearly, reports of stowaways arriving in the United States are
not rare. If the authorities at a port discover stowaways, the authorities
often take the position that the system is working. 272 The problem with
this position is that it fails to recognize that a suicide-bomber stowing
away in a container will simply detonate upon discovery.2 73
V.

CONCLUSION

"If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear
the result of a hundredbattles."
-

Sun Tzu 274

American seaports are critical assets to our nation, both from a
military and economic perspective.2 7 5 They are the gateway for

271

Id.
See, e.g., Dan McDonald, Two Palestinian Stowaways Found Aboard New
Bedford-Bound Freighter, SOUTHCOASTTODAY (Nov. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbes.dll/article?AID=/20101114/NEWS/ 1140
351/-1/rss30 (A U.S. Coast Guard captain emphasized the fact "that the crew
272

report[ing] the stowaways .

.

. [is] something that we can take some real confidence

in." The captain further commented that "[e]veryone did what they were expected to
do and did it in a timely manner.").
273 See Press Release, House Passes Rep. Markey Measures to Screen 100 Percent of
Air, Ship Cargo in 9/11 Bill (Jan. 9, 2007), available at ProQuest,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/469689977?accountid=34965
(reporting that,
upon discovery, two suicide bombers "killed themselves along with 10 Israelis").
274 SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 51 (Lionel Giles trans. 1963) (circa 500 B.C.).
275 See U.S. COAST GUARD, C.G. PUB. 3-0, OPERATIONS §§ 1,
2.2 (2012), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/CGPub_3O0.pdf.
"The maritime industry
continues to evolve as the world remains fully dependent on global maritime trade in
an advancing technology and information age. Varied and overlapping international
and sovereign legal and policy regimes governing the maritime domain pose practical
operational challenges." Id. § 1.1.
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American prosperity and for future economic growth.2 7 6 They are the
points of embarkation for U.S. military troops. 277 They also constitute
an almost irresistible target for international terrorists. 278 Unfortunately,
many of the current U.S. initiatives through the DHS to ensure cargo
container security are, to put it mildly, not meeting expectations. 2 79 For
example, the future of the TWIC program is dismal; 280 the DHS has
postponed the 100% scanning requirement at a time when only 4% of
the containers bound for the United States are actually scanned prior to
entering the country;281 no one has yet developed a tamper-proof cargo
container;2 8 2 and the fears about nuclear terrorism have not abated.2 8 3
In a 2013 report, an audit by the DHS's Office of Inspector General
uncovered the startling fact that "[c]argo containers arriving at the 22
maritime ports through which the greatest volume of containerized

See Press Release, Safeguarding Ports is Key to Homeland Security and Prosperity
(July 23, 2010), available at ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/759682
204?accountid=34965.
277 See, e.g., Press Release, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit Deploys
to EarthquakeDevastated Haiti (Jan. 16, 2010), http://www.iimef.marines.mil/News/NewsArticle/
tabid/472/Article/2802/22nd-marine-expeditionary-unit-deploys-to-earthquakedevastated-haiti.aspx.
278 See House Passes Rep. Markey Measures to Screen 100 Percent of Air, Ship Cargo
in 9/11 Bill, supra note 273.
279 See Bondareff & O'Neill, supra note 32 (concluding that port security is "the
stepchild of our transportation security program").
276

280 See id.

Jeff Bliss, U.S. Backs Off All-Cargo Scanning Goal With Inspections
at 4%,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0813/u-s-backs-off-all-cargo-scanning-goal-with-inspections-at-4-.html.
282 Mathew Rusling, After Six Years, Still No Tamper-Proof Shipping Containers,
NAT'L DEF. MAG., Mar. 2009, at 39, available at http://www.nationaldefense
magazine.org/archive/2009/March/Pages/AfterSixYears,StillNoTamper-Proof
ShippingContainers.aspx; see Timothy Page, DHS Looks to Tamper-Proof Cargo
Containers, OHMYGOv, INC. (Dec. 2, 2009, 10:47 AM), http://blog.ohmygov.com/
blogs/general news/archive/2009/12/02/dhs-looks-to-tamper-proof-cargocontainers.aspx.
283 Paige Willan, The Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism:
An Old Solution to a New Problem, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 527, 527 (2007-08).
281
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cargo enters the United States have not adequately been screened for
radiation as required by law . . . ."284
On May 28, 2013, the American Security Project located in
Washington, D.C., hosted a panel entitled Nuclear Terrorism: What's
at Stake?285 Dr. Stephen Flynn 28 6 reminded listeners that smuggling via
shipping containers occurs daily, supporting the possibility that
terrorists might use containers to transport nuclear weapons to the
United States. 287 Pointing out the weaknesses of the C-TPAT "honor
system," Flynn stated that "[tihe bottom line is the [container] system
remains highly vulnerable for folks to move things because it's
essentially an honor system, and it's an honor system of enormous
size."288 In terms of the trusted shipper approach on which the C-TPAT
is premised, Flynn expressed his conviction "that if and when nuclear
materials enter the U.S. through a port, 'it will come through a trusted
shipper' because terrorists know that those containers receive much
less scrutiny.289 Another member of the panel, Rear Admiral (retired)
Jay Cohen,2 9 0 expressed agreement with the panelists that the threat of
nuclear material entering the United States through its ports is quite

284

Anthony Kimery, DHS IG Finds 22 Ports Not Adequately Screening Cargo

Containers for Radiation; Former Port Security Official Provides Insight, THE
KIMERY REP. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/
dhs-ig-finds-22-ports-not-adequately-screening-cargo-containers-for-radiation-formerport-security-official-provides-insight/b7c57fc60ca972b37e87d55c26087c8 1.html
(citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-13-26, UNITED
STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION'S RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS AT
SEAPORTS 1 (2013), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG 1326_Janl3.pdf).
285

Holly Gilbert, Risk of Nuclear Materials Being Smuggled Through Ports Should

Be
Taken
Seriously, Say
Experts, SEC.
MGMT.
(May
29,
2013),
http://www.securitymanagement.com/print/12510.
286 Dr. Flynn is a "professor at Northeastern University and former president of the
Center for National Policy." Id.
287

id.

288

Id.

289

Id.

Rear Adm. Cohen previously served as Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Science and Technology. Id.

290
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real, when he stated, "It's only a question of where, when, and to what
magnitude." 29 1
The concern that the potential for a nuclear attack may become a
reality is also supported by one of Osama bin Laden's prime directives
to al-Qaeda-to destroy the American economy-something that the
chaos and magnitude of a nuclear attack would likely achieve. 292
"Further, Navy SEALs discovered plans evidencing that al-Qaeda has
identified the U.S. maritime industry as a prime target among the
materials found during the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden's hideout in
Pakistan. 293 In 2004, Aegis Defense Services warned of an imminent
maritime terror attack in light of the recent appointment of Saud Hamud
al-Utaibi, an expert in maritime terrorism, to head al-Qaeda in Saudi
Arabia. 294 Consequently, targeting American ports would assist in

291

Id; see also Graham Allison, Graham Allison Commentary: Don't Underestimate

Nuclear Terror Threat, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF Gov'T (Oct. 9, 2009),

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/news-archive/don-underestimatenuclear-terror; Nitin Bakshi, Stephen Flynn & Noah Gans, Countering the Threat of
Nuclear Terrorism at Domestic and ForeignPorts, Estimatingthe OperationalImpact
of Container Inspectors at International Ports, INFORMED DECISIONS ON
CATASTROPHE RISK (Wharton Center for Risk Mgmt. and Decision Processes, Univ.
of Pa., Phila., Pa.), Winter 2012, available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/
risk/1ibrary/WRCib2012aPort-Security.pdf (indicating that the vast amount of
shipping containers entering ports provide terrorists ample opportunity "to hide a
nuclear device").
292 A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden's Words: 'America Is in Decline,' the Leader of
Al Qaeda Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B2, available at 2001 WLNR 3362823.
Speaking in 2001, bin Laden instructed that if America's "economy is finished, they
will become too busy to enslave oppressed people.

. .

. God willing, America's end is

near.... America is in decline; the economic drain is continuing but more strikes are
required and the youths must strike the key sectors of the American economy." Id;
see also Bin Laden: Goal is to Bankrupt U.S., CNN (Nov. 1, 2004, 8:07 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/01/binladen.tape/. "We are continuing
this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing
is too great for Allah." Id.
293 See Press Release, Am. Ass'n of Port Auths., 10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a
Top Priority at U.S. Ports (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.aapa-ports.org/Press/
PRdetail.cfm?itemnumber- 18181.
294 Marine Terror Attack Plan to Spark Global Crises, MAILONLINE (Dec. 10, 2004,
9:01 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-330232/Marine-terror-attack-planspark-global-crisis.html# ("Al-Utaibi, thought to be behind the 2000 attack on the USS
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fulfilling one of the prime goals of Osama bin Laden, destruction of the
U.S. economy.295 Also, depending on the nature of an attack, disrupting
American ports could critically impact the nation's ability to deploy
military forces abroad in addition to the economy. 296
Those seeking to infiltrate and attack America would most likely
prefer to use containers because doing so allows them to stockpile
weapons at key ports within the United States.2 9 7 Containerization has
revolutionized the world in a way that Malcolm McLean never
envisioned.2 9 8 The number of stowaways and the amount of counterfeit
goods that people smuggle into the country, all via containers, highlight
the weaknesses of the current cargo security system. 2 99 Another
indicator of the flaws of the current system to prevent a container-born

Cole in the Yemeni port city of Aden, which killed 17 American sailors and injured
37, has the experience to make it happen."). Al-Utaibi's career was likely short-lived
due to his reported death in 2005. See HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 3 n.3
("The appointment ultimately did not provide significant upside career potential,
however, because Al-Utaibi reportedly was killed in a gun battle with Saudi security
officials in April 2005 (CNN.com, 2005, and Aljazeera.net, 2005).").
295 See Safeguarding Ports is Key to Homeland Sec. and Prosperity, supra note 276
(describing the importance of American seaports to "economic growth"); see also Bin
Laden: Goal is to Bankrupt U.S., supra note 292.
296 Crimes and Security Issues Involving U.S. Seaports: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. 3-4 (2001) (statement of Sen. Ernest F.
Hollings, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.).
ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE
CATASTROPHE 106-07 (2004) (stating that a nuclear attack is "far more likely to arrive
297 GRAHAM

in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile"); Bureau of Transp. Statistics,
Spotlight 2:

Maritime Security, RES. & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN.

(2011),

http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/americascontainer
ports/2011/html/spotlight02.html ("While notable progress has been made in
increasing port and container security over the past decade, major challenges still
remain."); Nat'l Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic
Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassifled Summary of a National Intelligence
Estimate, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Dec. 2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat2015.htm (concluding that the delivery of WMDs to the United States by containers

was more likely than by Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles).
298 See supra Part 111.
299 See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 297 (finding that
there are challenges
remaining to prevent transportation by containers of illicit drugs, people, and
weapons).

2013]

Simpson-Wood

119

attack on the United States is the amount of inadequate, if not false,
information that importers report to U.S. customs about the content of
containers, leading to a large volume of fraudulent goods that arrive in
the United States via containers.300 There is also strong evidence to
support the conclusion that "the documentation that declares just what is
in a container, and where it comes from, is often incomplete,
misleading, or outright falsified."30 ' Such realities confirm that there is
a serious and continuing problem with the current U.S. port security
system.30 2
While it is certainly true that there has been some advancement
in the area of port security since 9/11,303 there is still much that the
United States needs to do. 304 First and foremost, the United States must
officially recognize that the current selective container scanning
approach premised upon the identification of high-risk goods is not
working. 30 5 Continuing to aim for the goal of 100% scanning by
Cohen, supra note 193, at 104.
Id. at 104.
302 See Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 297 ("Containerships present unique
and particularly complex security challenges."); HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at
1-3 (stating that there is a strong need to secure ports because they remain an attractive
target for terrorists).
303 April Terreri, The Current State of Port Security, WORLD TRADE 100 (Oct.
5,
2009),
http://www.worldtradewtl00.com/articles/print/the-current-state-of-portsecurity; Bureau of Transp. Statistics, supra note 297.
300
301

304

See Bethann Rooney, Ten Years Later, Port Security Needs Remain, AM. Ass'N OF

(Winter, 2012-13), http://www.aapa-ports.org/Publications/Seaports
Detail.cfm?itemnumber-18875#seaportsarticlel6 (suggesting specific measures that
the United States needs to take to enhance port security); Council on Foreign Relations
Editorial Staff, Targetsfor Terrorism: Ports, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 2006),
http://www.cfr.org/port-security/targets-terrorism-ports/p10215
("[M]aritime
transportation is one of our nation's most serious vulnerabilities."); Douglas Frantz,
PORT AUTHS.

Port Security: U.S. Fails to Meet Deadlinefor Scanning Cargo Containers, WASH.

POST (July 15, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-15/world/3548
9894_1_port-security-port-vulnerability-cargo-containers (stating that the current
system is not adequate enough to prevent the shipping of illegal weapons into the
United States); Terreri, supra note 303 (stating that the layered approach is working,
but there is more to be done).
305 See Bondareff & O'Neill, supra note 32 ("Ports are certainly more secure than they
were before 9/11. But since 9/11, we have also lost sight of the critical role ports play
in our economy and transportation system.").
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delaying the effective date of the mandatory requirement 306 simply
presents an opportunity for terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, "to
compromise .. . legitimate shipments." 307
Faced with twenty-first century terrorism, it would be naive to
not "assume that the bad guys know who a trusted shipper is and will
target a trusted box first. It follows that a top priority must be to move
from the current 'trust but don't verify' system to one where verifiable
measures are in place to protect all shipments." 308 Shipping containers
are "ubiquitous, anonymous, and largely innocuous steel boxes" 309
arriving on vessels from foreign ports that clearly can transport illicit
devices or terrorist stowaways, thereby serving as "a Trojan horse for a
devastating attack on the United States." 310
It is also without question that the goal of having a fool-proof
system, which can ensure that a container is tamper proof, presents
unique and complex technical and economic challenges. 3 1 1 It is time for
the United States to rethink the 100% scanning requirement, 3 12 and not
See Bliss, supra note 281 (continuing to aim for the goal of 100% scanning will
cause huge delays).
307 See FLYNN, supra note
4, at 91.
308 Id.
306

309 MICHAEL D. GREENBERG ET AL., MARITIME TERRORISM:
RISK AND LIABILITY 111

(2006),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RANDMG
520.pdf.
310 Jerrold L. Nadler et al., Cargo the Terrorists' Trojan Horse, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-portsecurity.html?.
31 See Brian Kates, Harbor Fears High, Terror Funding
Low, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 21, 2003, http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/harbor-fears-high-terrorfunding-article-1.522970 (reporting that port security improvements require a huge
amount of money); Rusling, supra note 282, at 39 (stating that developing a fool-proof
system presents numerous technical challenges and requires companies to share
proprietary technology).
312 See infra notes 313-24 and accompanying text; see also, Nicholas Allen,
Perspectives in Responsible Sourcing: EU Criticizes US 100% Cargo Scan
Requirement, TYPEPAD (May 22, 2008, 5:37 AM), http://cscc.typepad.com/
responsiblesourcing/2008/05/eu-criticizes-u.html (stating that the EU has been critical
of the 100% scanning requirement); Stephen Heifetz, What to do with Really Dumb
Laws: A Look at Security Laws for Maritime and Air Cargo and Why They Can't
Effectively Be Enforced, SUPPLY & DEMAND CHAIN (Sept. 2, 2011),
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just because of economic arguments.3 13 While a lofty ideal, it simply is
unworkable from a realistic, logistical, labor-intensive perspective. 3 14
As former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, 315 recognized, "There are a lot of ways to protect the ports
of the United States . . . from dangerous cargo." 3 16 "It makes no sense,
she argued, to blindly strive to meet an inspection mandate 'if it's not
feasible, practical, affordable or causes undue interference with
cargo."' 317 An extension of the deadline for the mandate to 2014318
does not change the accuracy of her former statement. 3 19 The sound
basis for any scanning requirement must be rooted in a risk-based
approach that emphasizes quality over the quantity of scanning 3 20 and
that capitalizes on current technologies, not those of the future that may
never be realized.3 2 1 Clearly, the current scanning methods are

http://www.sdcexec.com/article/1 0323420/a-look-at-security-laws-for-maritime-andair-cargo-and-why-they-cant-effectively-be-enforced (noting that the 100% scanning
requirement is now "widely considered to be pure folly").
313 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
314 See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text; see also Roger Hailey, US Warned
100% Scanning at Box Ports 'Unworkable,' LLOYD'S LIST, July 23, 2010, at 1,
available at http://mastershipping.blog.com/files/2010/07/Lloyds-List-2010.7.23.pdf
(noting that 100% scanning of maritime containers requires a great deal of
technological resources and greater manpower).
315 After serving for four and a half years, Ms. Napolitano left office on September 6,
2013. Pete Williams, I Didn't Have as Many Gray Hairs When I Started: Homeland
Security Secretary Napolitano Steps Down After Longest Tenure, NBC NEWS (Sept. 5,
2013, 6:34 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/ news/2013/09/05/20345853-i-didnthave-as-many-gray-hairs-when-i-started-homeland-security-secretary-napolitanosteps-down-after-longest-tenure?lite.
316 James Carafano, Napolitano Gets It Right on Cargo Screening, THE HERITAGE
FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/08/
napolitano-gets-it-right-on-cargo-screening.
317

Id.

DHS Waives Deadlinefor 100% Box Scans, INT'L FED'N OF CUSTOMS BROKERS
Ass'N (May 11, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://www.ifcba.org/content/dhs-waives-deadline100-box-scans.
319 See supra text accompanying note 317.
320 See Heifetz, supra note 312 (stating that collecting data about cargo and subjecting
high-risk cargo to a special level of scrutiny is the best way to enhance port security).
321 See id. (noting that the U.S. government currently lacks adequate technology to
accomplish mass scanning).
318
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ineffective.322 Perhaps the problem is that the focus seems to be on
inspections rather than "on developing more transparent and better
designed and controlled global supply chain processes."3 23 Arguably,
absent such focus, "100 percent inspection of cargo is a means to many
ends, except a more secure supply chain." 324
Concentrating on creating a container that will let a handler
know that it has been compromised is the better route to take. For
example, in 2006, the Space and Naval Warfare System Center awarded
the University of Maine in conjunction with Maine Secure Composites,
LLC, a technology spinoff from the university's composite labs, a grant
in excess of $12 million for development and prototyping of Composite
Anti-Tamper Containers . .. for maritime cargo transport."3 2 5
Another key issue is providing complete funding for the Port
Security Grant Program (the "PSGP") with an emphasis on improving
seals for containers.326 Pursuant to its charges under the MTSA, the
DHS established the PSGP, "a risk based grant program to support
maritime security risk management." 327 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency ("FEMA") administers the program.328 The
purpose of grant-awarded funding is to implement the "Area Maritime
Security Plans . . . and Facility Security Plans . . . among port

authorities, facility operators, and [s]tate and local government agencies

322 See supra text accompanying note 299; HAVEMAN & SHATZ, supra note 19, at 3

(noting that "the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system is extremely
high.").
323 Adrian Gonzalez, 100% Cargo Inspection: A Means to What End?, LOGISTICS
VIEWPOINTS (Dec. 3, 2009), http://logisticsviewpoints.com/2009/12/03/100-cargoinspection-a-means-to-what-end/.
324

Id.

Staff, Industry News: UMaine Spinoff Wins $12 Million Secure Cargo Container
Contract, COMPOSITES WORLD (June 1, 2008), http://www.compositesworld.com/
news/umaine-spinoff-wins-12-million-secure-cargo-container-contract.
326 See infra notes 327-35 and accompanying text; see also Randal
Mullet, Container
Seals: What Does PAS ISO 17712 Mean to You? An International Cargo Security
Council Perspective, PORT TECH. INT'L 154, http://www.porttechnology.org/
images/uploads/technicalpapers/PT27-34.pdf (discussing container seal guidelines).
327 FY 2013 Port Security Grant Program, http://www.fema.gov/fy-2013-portsecurity-grant-program-psgp-0 (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
328 Bondareff & O'Neil, supra note 32.
325
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that are required to provide port security services." 329 Those entities are
to use the awarded funds, inter alia, to "fund pilot programs ... [and] to

examine or develop" a more effective seal for shipping cargo containers
in order to track the contents of a specific container. 3 30
During 2008 and 2009, the funding for the PSGP "was at its
authorized level . .. at nearly $400 million each year." 33 1 However,
beginning with 2010, the funding level has "eroded leaving the program
funded at only $97.5 million in [fiscal year] 2012, the lowest level ...
since its inception in 2002."332 The decrease in funding is strong
evidence that the security of cargo containers and of U.S. ports is no
longer a primary concern. The major decrease in port security funding
is not only foolish, but it could be tragic. "Our economy, our safety,
and our national defense depend largely on how well we can protect our
seaports, and cuts in federal funding present significant challenges" in
maintaining port security. 3 33 The 9/11 Commission Report made it
clear that "opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime
and surface transportation" as they are in any land-based transportation
sector.3 34 It is of paramount importance that Congress once again
prioritizes cargo and port security by increasing the PSGP funding to
the authorized level.33 5
While not the subject of this Article, suggestions for increasing
cargo security would not be complete without touching upon the need to
reconsider the onus placed upon the vessel owner in terms of liability
for cargo 336 and the financial burdens placed on carriers who transport a

FY 2013 PortSecurity Grant Program,supra note 327.
330 46 U.S.C. § 70107(m)(1)(D) (2006).
329

331 Hearing on "HomelandSecurity Grants: Measuring our Investments" Before the
H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Kurt J. Nagle, the
president and CEO of American Association of Port Authorities).
332

id.

333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.

See Kevin P. Maney, "Said to Contain": Fear of Incurring Liability Creates a
Disincentive for Cargo Carriers to Improve Shipping Container Security by
Examining Cargo, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 317, 330-33 (2010) (discussing the burden of
336
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stowaway. 33 7 Current laws encourage inhumane actions against
stowaways 338 and discourage carriers from improving container security
by examining containers. 339 The master of a vessel is there to protect
the interests of the carrier, not the shipper. 340 The age-old rules for a

proof in a cargo claim and the current disincentives for a carrier to increase container
inspections).
33 See Forrest Booth & Larry Altenbrun, Maritime and Port Security, Piracy, and
Stowaways: Renewed Concerns Over Old Problems, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 44-47
(2003) (discussing the financial burdens placed on any carrier who transports a
stowaway, ranging from fines for allowing a stowaway to escape to being responsible
for detainment and repatriation expenses).
338 See id
3
See Maney, supra note 336, at 329-31 ("Once a shipper closes a container, it is not
in the carrier's interest to open the container again, because should cargo arrive at its
destination damaged, it would be much easier for the shipper to prove that the carrier's
negligence caused the damage if the container had been opened after it left the control
of the shipper."); Booth & Altenbrun, supra note 337, at 46-47. "While some
provisions, such as the imposition of fines and placing financial responsibility for the
stowaway on the shipowner, are intended to provide incentives for shipowners to take
measures to prevent stowaways, statistics show that both the current statutory regime
and shipowners' prevention measures have been unsuccessful." Id. at 46. With the
advent of the cargo container, "today's stowaway is more likely to load himself, and
perhaps several neighbors and relatives, into a container." Id. Consequently, "there is
currently little the carrier can do to either prevent or even detect the stowaway." Id.
In light of "these circumstances, the present system of shifting the entire cost of the
stowaway problem to the carrier seems to be unfair." Id. at 46-47; see also Robert M.
Jarvis, Rusting in Drydock: Stowaways, Shipowners and the Administrative Penalty
ProvisionoflNA Section 273(d), 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 25 (1998) (discussing the inability
of section 273(d) to deter stowaways); David A. Nourse, Detention of Stowaways:
Who Should Bear the Cost?, 6 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 435 (1994) (discussing the detention
of stowaways and how detention should be the responsibility of shipowners while
stowaways are on the ship but the responsibility of the public, i.e., the government,
once stowaways get off the ship).
340 See Eric Murdoch & David Tozer, A Master's Guide to Container Securing,
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/153635290/A-Masters-Guide-to-ContainerSecuring (discussing how cargo claims have increased due to lost cargos and how ship
masters need to be aware of what can be done to prevent container loss, thereby
protecting the carriers).
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master are to (1) never accept a damaged container and (2) never open a
container loaded onto the vessel.3 4 '
Perhaps the way to achieve all of these goals is to create an
additional "lead agency in [the] DHS for port security," 342 which would
also be of great assistance in achieving the goal of hardening and
heightening the requisite cargo container security level.34 3
The hope is that continued adoption and use of new
technologies,344 tightening security at port facilities, and learning to
think outside of the box in terms of expanding the focus of security
measures beyond cartographic borders will ultimately result in physical,
economic, and environmental safety for the people and ports of the
United States.
It is, however, also important to remain ever vigilant. On
September 5, 2013, Bloomberg Businessweek published an article about
the world's largest container ship. 34 5 The blurb for the full article reads,
On a dry-dock in South Korea[,] Maersk is building the
world's biggest ship. A container vessel, it will ply the
route between Northern Europe and China. It is called
the Triple-E and the Danish shipbuilder has ordered 20
of them, at a cost of $185 million each. A Triple-E, in
one trip, could transport more [than] 182 million iPads,
or 111 million pairs of shoes, from Shanghai to

341 Id.; see Maney, supra note 336, at 330-32 (discussing the burden of proof in a
cargo claim and the current disincentives for a carrier to increase container
inspections).
342 Bondareff & O'Neil, supra note 32.
343 See id. (discussing different programs that would help strengthen port and
container security).
344 See Rep. of the Sub-Comm. on the Proliferation of Military Tech., Technology and
Terrorism: A Post-September 11 Assessment, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, AV
200 STC/MT (02) 4 rev. 1 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.natopa.int/default.asp?COM=256&PRINT1
(discussing
potential
and
current
technologies that can be employed to defeat terrorism).
345 Drake Bennett, Risk Ahoy: Maersk, Daewoo Build the World's Biggest Boat,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAG. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/

printer/articles/149396-risk-ahoy-maersk-daewoo-build-the-worlds-biggest-boat.
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Rotterdam. Stood on its stem, its bow would stretch 19
meters above the roof of the Empire State Building. 346
In a time ripe for maritime terrorists to employ containers to
deliver destruction, a vessel of such magnitude calls to mind the wise
words of the Trojan priest, Laocodn: "Equo ne credite, Teucri.
Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et donaferentes."347

346

Video

of

World's Biggest

Ship, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK VIDEOS,
http://www.businessweek.com/videos/2013-09-04/worlds-biggest-ship-the-i 85mmaersk-triple-e. Bigger, however, does not necessarily mean better. See Chris Jasper,
The World's Largest Ship, Maersk's Triple-E, May Be Too Large, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK MAG. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201304-25/the-worlds-largest-ship-maersks-triple-e-may-be-too-large ("Maersk ... Line's
Triple-E class container supership will be the biggest vessel afloat when it enters
service in July, with a capacity of 18,000 20-foot boxes. Unfortunately for the world's
largest shipping line, the $190 million Triple-E is too big for any port in the Americas
and can't make it through the Panama Canal. That restricts it to an Asia-Europe
market, where growth in cargo demand is weaker than forecast when Maersk ordered
20 of the megaships two years ago from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering
. . . for a total of $3.8 billion.").
347 VIRGIL, THE AENEID: BOOK II, 1-56 (A. S. Kline trans. 2002) (19 B.C.E.),

available at http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/VirgilAeneidll.htm#
Toc536009309 ("Trojans, don't trust this horse. Whatever it is, I'm afraid of Greeks
even those bearing gifts.").

